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**ANCHORED MORAL VALUES: THE EFFECT OF ANCHORING  
AND MORAL IDENTITY ON MORAL DECISION-MAKING AND  
JUDGEMENT**

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*To Prof. Dr. Dođan KÖKDEMİR...*

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## ÖZET

**AKKAYA, Ayşe Betül. Çapalanan Ahlaki Değerler: Çapalama ve Ahlaki Kimliğin Ahlaki Karar Alma ve Yargıya Varma Üzerindeki Etkisi. Başkent Üniversitesi, Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü, Sosyal Psikoloji Tezli Yüksek Lisans Programı, 2024.**

Ahlaki karar alma ve yargıya varma üzerine yapılan çalışmalar son yıllarda giderek artmaktadır. Literatürde, diğer kararlarda olduğu gibi ahlaki karar alma süreçlerinde de insanların kararlarının bilişsel etkilerden etkilendiği ortaya konmuştur. Bu çalışma, insanların ahlaki karar verme ve yargılama süreçlerinin bu bilişsel etkilerden biri olan çapalama ve ahlaki kimlik kavramından nasıl etkilendiğini incelemeyi amaçlamıştır. Ahlaki yargıları ölçmek için klasik ahlaki ikilem senaryolarının kullanıldığı bu çalışmada ayrıca ahlaki kimliğin ve ahlaki bir düşünme eğilimi olan faydacılığın ahlaki yargıları ne ölçüde yordadığı incelenmiştir. Çalışma, yaşları 18 ile 65 arasında değişen 253 katılımcı ile gerçekleştirilmiştir. Katılımcılar maruz kaldıkları çapalama etkisine göre yüksek, düşük veya çapalamanın olmadığı gruba ayrılmıştır. Ayrıca ahlaki kimlik içselleştirme durumlarına göre düşük ahlaki kimlik içselleştirme ve yüksek ahlaki kimlik içselleştirme grupları elde edilmiştir. Kişilerin ahlaki yargıları çapalama etkisinden önemli ölçüde etkilenmiş ve yüksek çapalama grubunda yer alan katılımcıların ahlaki yargıları düşük ve hiç çapalamanın olmadığı gruba kıyasla farklılaşmıştır. Bu sonuç, çapalama etkisinin ahlaki yargı alanına genişletilebileceği görüşüne katkıda bulunmaktadır. Ancak, katılımcıların ahlaki kimlik içselleştirme düzeylerinin düşük ya da yüksek olması ahlaki yargılarında bir değişikliğe yol açmamıştır. Ayrıca, ahlaki yargıları incelemek için kullanılan klasik ahlaki ikilemlerinin, faydacılığın sadece zarar boyutunu ele alarak faydacılığı bir bütün olarak ele almadığı gösterilmiştir. Çalışmadan elde edilen bulgular literatür ışığında tartışılmıştır.

**Anahtar Kelimeler:** çapalama etkisi, ahlaki yargı, ahlaki karar verme, ahlaki kimlik, faydacılık

## ABSTRACT

**Akkaya, Ayşe Betül. Anchored Moral Values: The Effect of Anchoring and Moral Identity on Moral Decision-Making and Judgement. Başkent University, Institute of Social Sciences, Social Psychology Master's Program with Thesis, 2024.**

Studies on moral decision-making and judgment have been increasing in recent years. In the literature, it has been demonstrated that people's decisions are affected by cognitive influences in moral decision-making processes as in other decisions. This study aimed to examine how people's moral decision-making and judgment processes are affected by anchoring, one of these cognitive effects, and the concept of moral identity. By using classical moral dilemma scenarios to measure moral judgments, this study also examined the extent to which moral identity and utilitarianism, a moral thinking disposition, predict moral judgments. The study was conducted with 253 participants aged 18 to 65. Participants were divided into high, low, or no anchoring groups according to the anchoring effect they were exposed to. Also, low moral identity internalization and high moral identity internalization groups were obtained according to their moral identity internalization status. People's moral judgments were significantly affected by the anchoring effect, and the moral judgments of the participants in the high anchoring group differed compared to the low and no anchoring group. This result contributes to the view that the anchoring effect can be extended to the domain of moral judgment. However, whether the participants' moral identity internalization level was low or high did not lead to a change in their moral judgments. Moreover, it has been shown that classical moral dilemmas used to examine moral judgments do not capture utilitarianism as a whole by considering only the harm dimension of utilitarianism. The findings obtained from the study are discussed in the light of the literature.

**Keywords:** anchoring effect, moral judgement, moral decision making, moral identity, utilitarianism

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## **LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS**

OUS	Oxford Utilitarianism Scale
OUS- IB	Oxford Utilitarianism Scale- Impartial Beneficence
OUS- IH	Oxford Utilitarianism Scale- Instrumental Harm
MI- I	Moral Identity- Internalization

# 1. INTRODUCTION

The Turkish Language Institution defines morality as the standards and patterns of behavior that everyone in a society has to adhere to. What exactly are these moral standards, and what guides us?

Historically, the youngest members of a household in many parts of East Africa and Ethiopia would eat whatever was left over from the food consumed by their father, mother, guests, and older siblings, even though malnutrition can lead to diseases such as kwashiorkor, marasmus, or rickets in some children (Edgerton, 1992/2022). Today, in most developed or developing nations, if a child is exposed to such treatment by their family, we would expect the state to act on behalf of the family, even if it means removing the child from the family. On the flip side, the moral and cultural norms that some societies have adopted and practiced in past centuries can still be the subject of debate today. For example, the "Dukhobors," a Russian ethnic minority group, abstained from eating meat and killing animals as part of their beliefs; they also abandoned the use of weapons and refused to join military service, and this cultural attitude led to their expulsion from their region (Alston, 2014).

When we consider how the psychology of morality has emerged, it is assumed that a large part of the process is due to evolutionary processes through natural selection. However, this natural selection is shaped more by the social environment rather than the physical environment (Tomasello, 2018). According to Darwin (1871/2008), in consequence of biological distinctions that render human beings weaker than other species in the natural environment, humans have had to act and live together in order to deal with the impediments that arise in nature. As a result, they have acquired social behaviors that will further their distinctive characteristics. By preventing selfish acts that are unfavorable to the group, moral standards have enabled people to live in communes while strengthening their social interactions (de Waal & Waal, 1996).

Furthermore, morality is not merely a new concept that homo sapiens have picked up, according to Frans de Waal (2013/2018). To put it another way, morality is engrained in our biology from the inside out; instead of building this moral aspect from scratch, we have continued to add bricks to an already-built structure (de Waal, 2013/2018). Rather than encapsulating a fixed facet of human nature, these moral frameworks and principles speak to how we arrange ourselves and the world. While universality is in some ways anticipated,

and no single law has been accountable for putting moral principles into reality, it might diverge within every society and over the course of history. As social forms of existence evolve, moral concepts that influence them also may not remain constant (MacIntyre, 1998).

When the history of the planet's emergence and the evolutionary process are taken into account, humans' projection on Earth is recognized as relatively recent. In this very short time, humans have evolved a variety of behavioral patterns that enable peaceful coexistence. One of these patterns is moral rules, and it can be shown that these laws have miscellaneous forms in differing locations and times (Russell, 1954/2021).

### **1.1 Why Does Studying Morality Matter?**

Morality is a source of behavior as well as its result. Important choices are at the forefront of these moral behaviors because we all, in the real world, favor a particular group of moral principles over another (Russel, 1954/2021). Although moral decisions and behaviors may seem rather conceptual and extracted from practical life when we think about them, the purpose of morality is to develop the skills that will allow us to uncover the shortest route (Cohen, 2007/2019), meaning that the results of our moral decisions have an enormous influence in the practical reality.

It is essential to apprehend how individuals comprehend morality and the variousness in thinking processes that happen during the pre-action phase of these patterns when decisions are being made. Because how individuals classify specific activities as "right" or "wrong" has an impact on many facets of life (Hofmann et al., 2014). In other phrases, the practical projection of morality emerges as inevitable in a plethora of domains, including, for example, law, politics, medicine, and education. Therefore, since moral reasoning permeates all parts of daily life, behavioral sciences must prioritize investigating the psychological foundations of moral judgment and decision-making (Bartels et al., 2015).

### **1.2. Morality in Psychology Research**

One of the essential pillars of social life, morality, has been the subject of psychological theories for over a century; in addition, discussions on the presence of morality may be traced back to the Greek philosophers (Killen & Smetana, 2015).

Moral psychology emerged from a moral philosophy named normative ethics, which addresses how people should behave and why behaviors are acknowledged as right or wrong (Hester & Gray, 2020). The two most prominent normative theories in normative ethics are utilitarianism and deontology. Deontology stipulates that one should behave in conformity with general principles even when doing so would not benefit the majority. It frequently prohibits harming, meaning that harm should never be done, regardless of the situation (Kant 1785/1993). On the other hand, utilitarianism holds that the ideal moral decision is the one that results in the best overall outcomes and is independent of context and circumstances (e.g., killing or causing injury is permissible if it serves the interests of the majority) (Mill, 1861/1998).

Moral psychology, or the study of how individuals make decisions regarding morality, focuses on descriptive ethics as opposed to normative moral philosophy (Hester & Gray, 2020). Utilitarianism and deontology are the primary moral philosophies influencing decision-making (Tanner et al., 2008). Using sacrificial dilemmas to scrutinize the distinction between utilitarian and deontological judgments has gained prominence in moral psychology (Kahane et al., 2018). Moral dilemmas, which are brief situations in which a person is caught between two alternatives because of contradicting moral principles, are commonly utilized in the research of moral judgments (Kumova & Bahçekapılı, 2020). When studying moral reasoning in an experimental setting, researchers frequently use situations in which many people's lives are in danger (Körner et al., 2019). These texts included stories with deontological (concerning rights and responsibilities) and utilitarian (concerning cost-benefit of options) moral codes.

The preference for utilitarianism or deontology might vary depending on several factors, according to research that uses moral dilemma situations. For instance, when presented with moral dilemmas, it has been revealed that people under stress (Youssef et al., 2012) and acute stress (Starcke et al., 2012) behave less utilitarianly. The suppression of the condition of cognitive control has been connected explicitly to decreased utilitarian reactions linked to regulated cognitive processing. Research on the impact of foreign languages on moral judgment has also focused on this matter. According to Costa et al.'s (2014) assessment of the impact of foreign languages employing moral dilemmas, decisions made in a foreign language result in utilitarian reactions. It is clear from the research that learning a foreign language makes people less engaged in the process of making moral judgments in

that language and less sensitive to social norms, which helps explain why learning a language has this kind of impact (Bialek et al., 2019).

Unexpected outcomes were observed in some individuals who preferred utilitarianism in moral dilemma scenarios involving sacrificial behaviors. People with prefrontal brain damage made atypically utilitarian decisions compared to a control group (Martins et al., 2012). Besides, participants with psychopathic personality traits who scored higher preferred more utilitarian options for dilemmas (Bartels & Pizarro, 2011; Glenn et al., 2010; Koenings et al., 2012). Apart from the findings that contradict each other regarding the relationship between dilemmas and utilitarianism, there is also an assumption that utilitarianism is purely negative and consists of harming others when necessary to achieve a better outcome in dilemmas; in other words, it is instrumental harm. Furthermore, the dimension known as "impartial beneficence," which aims to maximize goodness objectively by pursuing a universal state of well-being rather than our relatives or those in the vicinity of us for the emergence of the greater good, has been disregarded (Kahane et al., 2018). A tool utilized in recent years in research pertaining to moral judgment, the "Oxford Utilitarianism Scale" was developed to more thoroughly assess the two dimensions of utilitarianism as a trait (Kahane et al., 2018). In view of this, in order to examine utilitarianism more thoroughly in this study, the "Oxford Utilitarianism Scale" was employed in addition to moral dilemmas.

Nevertheless, there are criticisms of the moral dilemma scenario employed in research for being unreal. Additionally, it was demonstrated that participants' preferences for the utilitarian or deontological choice rely on how plausible the problems are, whatever how more or less plausible they are (Körner et al., 2019). Given that moral decisions are made by knowing who executed the act in real life, the absence of identifying information in moral dilemma situations has also come under fire (Hester & Grey, 2020). Furthermore, there is a deficiency of studies on the differences between cultures in moral behavior and moral judgments (Graham et al., 2016).

### **1.2.1. Moral psychology and culture**

Moral decision-making processes can vary enormously depending on the circumstances (Bartels et al., 2015). Even though many cultures share the view that there are specific wrongs and rights, the specifics of moral beliefs shift over time and place (Shweder et al., 1987). Moreover, not only do different historical periods and regions differ in terms

of what is appropriate, but these divisions have existed even within the same historical period of a given geography (Russell, 1954/2021). What is and is not categorized as morally relevant will depend on the cultural variations that drive and impact the center of moral emphasis in attitudes about social situations (Graham et al., 2016). According to Shweder (1991), moral judgments are significantly influenced by cultural norms and emotions that are products of that society. Far from being rigid and fixed, social morality, which supplies a general framework for the society in which we live, is fluid, dynamic, and interactive, like many of its sub-aspects, such as traditional norms, language rules, and fashion. Besides, one of the elements and forces that ensure the dynamism of this morality is the law; for example, changing the law can indirectly help change our morality (Green, 2013).

Given the consequence of culture on morality, conducting research in diverse cultures is crucial to draw more comprehensive conclusions that can be applied across cultures because most of the research has been conducted in industrialized Western countries (Markus & Kitayama, 1991).

### **1.3. Moral Cognition, Decision-Making and Judgement**

Cognitive processes and cognitive biases in the decision-making process are some of the essential and focused topics in the moral decision-making and judgment literature. Humans are not as rational as we have been led to believe, as demonstrated by Tversky and Kahneman (1973, 1974, 1989), and moral judgment and decision-making are no exception to the misconceptions and biases that affect rational judgment and decision-making. People can make errors not only in non-moral issues but also in decision-making circumstances involving moral issues (Monroe & Malle, 2019). Also, they employ moral heuristics in their decision-making, even when endeavoring so result in inappropriate or erroneous conclusions (Sunstein, 2003).

Numerous cognitive processes linked to moral cognition have been noted in the literature to influence and play a role in the decision-making process. Sunk cost bias has been investigated to see whether it would influence moral decision-making. Sunk cost bias misled participants in a study that utilized a variety of moral dilemmas, leading them to favor more pointless and immoral solutions (Meyer et al., 2019). Another subject that has been looked into is the behavioral base rate, another bias in decision-making and judgment. The moral judgment processes of those participating in the base rate bias condition are impacted,

even though the effect size is minimal (Jago, 2021). Besides, participants who centered on the outcomes of action were shown to be more vulnerable to the framing effect (Tanner et al., 2008). Furthermore, a study incorporating competing moral principles revealed that people's moral judgments have been affected by whatever principle was cognitively easier to reach in their minds at the time of decision-making, demonstrating that unconscious processes can also influence moral judgments (Broeders, 2011).

In recent years, moral cognition has been one of the most examined subjects in social psychology. As with other domains, it is evident that many factors can influence the decision-making processes involved in moral issues.

### **1.3.1. Anchoring, moral decision-making and judgement**

The anchoring effect is another pivotal mechanism that helps elucidate the biases in this judgment and decision-making process. The anchoring effect, which sheds light on the functioning of norms, is a situation in which a stimulus- typically numerical values- often blatantly uninformative and irrelevant to the recipient, increases the normality of a possible outcome (Kahneman, 1992). This effect is a cognitive heuristic that has several consequences for decision-making processes in addition to being pervasive and potent (Furnham & Boo, 2011). Also, anchoring can be so potent that even professional real estate agents' estimates of the value of a house were found to be influenced by the informative and irrelevant distractor anchoring value to which they were exposed in Neele et al.'s (1987) study examining anchoring effect. The anchoring effect is especially widespread and has been revealed in a variety of fields, including the assumption of pricing (Mussweiler et al., 2000), the legal domain (Bystranowski et al., 2021), self-efficacy regarding capability (Cervone & Peake, 1986); probability estimates about specific events (Plous, 1989); journalism (Lee & Hamilton, 2022); group decision-making (Stettinger et al., 2015; de Wilde et al., 2018); people's perceptions of wealth inequality (Eriksson & Simpson, 2012), and charitable giving (Hysenbelli et al., 2013).

The anchoring effect was observed even when the participants were given anchors utterly unrelated to the context and subject at issue (Ariely et al., 2003; Tversky & Kahneman, 1974; Englich et al., 2006). Besides, even values that did not make sense in context (Strack & Mussweiler, 1997) or anchor values that were not informative for people's predictions had been shown to lead to anchoring effects (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974).

Additionally, although bias is typically detected via an external anchor, anchors can also be based on prior assumptions made by the subject of the study (Furnham & Boo, 2011) as well as information from a different source. A critical characteristic of the anchor effect is that it competes with other information sources, even if they are instructive about the subject, and anchor effects are likely to be considerably more remarkable in the absence of other signals (Kahneman, 1992). More uncertainty, less familiarity, relevance, or connectedness to the circumstance will all be associated with a greater inclination to accept such anchors as a possible response and more potent anchoring effects (Van Exel et al., 2006). It is interesting that studies have demonstrated that incentives, especially financial ones (Enke et al., 2023), fail to reduce the anchoring effect (Wilson et al., 1996). One of the significant consequences of this cognitive effect is that we frequently are not conscious of the fact that how we approach situations might alter when they are presented and constructed from different viewpoints (Kahneman, 1992).

Although studies on anchoring bias, which has an impact on people's cognitive processes, often pay attention to finance, economics, and law fields, this effect has also been shown in studies in the moral domain. People may be influenced by a variety of contextual information when making moral decisions, just like they are when making other kinds of decisions (Andrejevic et al., 2020). When presented with new contextual knowledge, decision-makers can also modify their preferred route choice (Andrejevic et al., 2020). Sacred and protected values are far from being rigorously rigid, contrary to the notion that moral judgments are unchanging and fixed. However, the decision-making and judgment processes associated with these issues can be highly complicated and volatile (Iliev et al., 2009). In a study using moral dilemmas, anchoring values influenced how permissible these dilemmas were perceived (Brand & Oaksford, 2015). It seems that these anchoring values may be perceived as baselines in this decision-making process. (Brand & Oaksford, 2015). Hysenbelli et al. (2013) used a story of a child with brain damage who needed financial help to examine the influence of anchoring on charitable giving. They found that people exposed to the high anchor effect donated more. On the other hand, it is pivotal to research the anchoring effect in many different cultural settings since this does not always provide homogeneous results across cultural contexts (Kakinohana et al., 2023).

Consequently, our thoughts and judgments related to morality do not occur independently of the outside world and can be affected by myriad variables. Our shared groups assist in shaping our values and clarify how they function as a social moral anchor

(Ellemers & Van der Toorn, 2015). Likewise, the cultural context in which we live, the moral standards that we internalize as a result of that culture, and the laws that govern us may all function as an "anchor" for the decisions we make in daily life.

### **1.3.2. The underlying mechanism of the anchoring effect**

The mechanisms underlying the anchoring effect are still a hot topic of debate in the literature (Bahník et al., 2022), and various researchers have proposed explanations from different perspectives.

Furham and Boo (2011) categorized some of the mechanisms explaining the anchoring effect into three categories, namely "anchoring-and-adjustment," "selective accessibility," and "attitude change." Firstly, according to the anchoring-and-adjustment explanation, anchoring works as a result of inadequate adjustment processes relative to the value to which one is initially exposed; these anchor values serve as a reference for adjusting options within one's range of reasonable values (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974; Epley & Gilovich, 2001). Secondly, according to the selective accessibility explanation, individuals test that the anchor value they are exposed to is not the correct answer and try to make the aspects of the answer that are in line with the anchor accessible by searching for options that are similar to the anchor (Chapman & Johnson, 1999). Thirdly, regarding the attitude change explanation, anchors can be a cue that conveys judgments towards the anchor value in the information processing process; depending on whether the information processing process is more efficient or not, in more detailed information processing, information consistent with the exposed anchor is recalled, while in less detailed information processing, the anchor value is directly evaluated as a cue (Blankenship, 2008).

Bahník et al. (2022) categorized the explanations of the anchoring effect in the literature into five categories, two of which are insufficient adjustment (anchoring and adjustment) and selective accessibility, as mentioned in the paragraph above, and the other three are conversational inferences, numeric priming, and scale distortion. Conversational inferences are situations in which the anchor itself or the context, which depends on the way the anchor is presented, is perceived by the person as informative information containing a cue (Grice, 1975), and the anchor's effect emerges. Numeric priming implies that the numerical anchor value becomes more accessible and attainable for the decision-maker and that only the pure numerical value creates an anchoring effect independent of any other

influence. Finally, scale distortion implies that rather than a more fundamental alteration in the underlying representation of the target being evaluated, anchoring effects can arise from an alteration in the response scale's application (Frederick & Mochon, 2012).

The anchoring effect could result from several processes. Even if these processes have different operations, this does not necessarily mean that multiple mechanisms cannot operate simultaneously (Bahník et al., 2022).

#### **1.4. Moral Identity**

People do not assign an identical value to every issue and place it on the same scale of importance; some issues and matters are exceptional (Inglehart & Baker, 2000). Morality is one of the main issues of uneven importance to people in this perspective; philosophers have also argued that morality is perhaps the most important component of personal identity (Prinz & Nichols, 2016). In a study conducted with children, they rated moral goodness as more immutable and stable than other personality traits when asked to assess various personality traits (Heyman & Dweck, 1998).

Moral identity is one of the variables that attracts attention in understanding moral functioning; it also has an important place (Blasi, 1984). Also, moral identity has been suggested to be the best psychological construct that may play a role in the emergence of moral behavior (Damon & Hart, 1992). Moral self-examinations have skipped mainly over moral psychology throughout the years, focusing instead on moral reasoning and the foundations of moral judgments (Moin & Jordan, 2009). A substantial body of research has shown that moral identity, rather than moral reasoning, is also crucial in understanding moral behavior (Stets, 2010).

Blasi (1983) coined the term "moral identity" to describe the degree to which morality and moral identity are present in the self. Firstly, Augusta Blasi (1983, 2004) asserted that one of the most important factors between moral behavior and moral judgment is the centrality of moral identity in the self. Individuals have a moral identity when they identify being a moral person as central to them. In Blasi's model of the self (1983), moral judgments more reliably predict moral behavior if they are filtered through the filter of responsibility based on moral identity and act on the basis of self-consistency. Aquino and colleagues have also claimed that moral identity is an essential source of motivation to behave morally because people often want to maintain self-consistency. When moral identity is highly

important to oneself, one will feel obligated to behave morally to sustain self-consistency (Blasi, 1980, 1993, 2004). Aquino and Reed (2002) introduced a new approach by empirically examining Blasi's moral identity. They developed the moral identity scale to measure the importance of moral identity for the individual, which includes two subscales measuring whether it is personally important for the individual to have moral traits (internalization) and the extent to which the individual believes that he or she reflects morality in his or her daily activities and actions (symbolization). Decision-makers with high moral identity place a higher importance on their moral character than those with low moral identity. They are more likely to explore moral concerns actively and are generally more motivated to act in moral ways (Blasi, 2004; Schlenker et al., 2009). According to Glenn et al. (2010), those who scored better on a test of psychopathic traits were less likely to rely on their self-concepts on moral qualities. The disconnect between moral judgment and action may perhaps be explained by moral identity (Reynold & Ceranic, 2007), which may be an essential source of moral motivation. Differences and variations in people's perceptions of moral and immoral behavior may lead them to vary in the value they place on morality as a conception of the self (Glenn et al., 2010).

Aquino et al. (2009), in a subsequent study linking moral identity with the cognitive model, showed that when moral identity is considered to be very central and core to the person, it is activated more because it is stronger and more frequent than other self-schemas and is accessed more by the person. According to sociocognitive explanations, having a strong moral identity increases the availability of information schemata and knowledge structures that influence self-regulation and foster moral action (Lapsley & Hill, 2009). On the other hand, even though moral identity is more accessible than other self-schemas, situational cues can activate or deactivate moral identity, drawing attention to situational factors in the temporary activation of moral identity in consciousness (Aquino et al., 2009). In the case of temporarily high moral identity salience and moral identity, they become readily available in the working self-concept to process information involving these moral issues.

A total of 111 studies from a wide range of academic disciplines, including psychology, education, marketing, and others, found a significant relationship between moral identity and moral behavior, with the largest effect sizes being found in studies that solely depended on self-reports and the smallest effect sizes being found in studies that used implicit measures and priming to elicit moral identity. This meta-analysis confirms the

hypothesis that moral identity predicts moral conduct, but the size of this impact suggests that moral identity is not a very potent predictor of moral action; instead, it has a modest to moderate effect size (Hertz & Krettenauer, 2016).

On the other hand, although researching the significance of moral identity is one of the motivating factors for moral action, the degree to which moral identity is fundamental to a person may not necessarily result in moral behavior (Hardy & Carlo, 2005). If a person's moral identity and prior behavior are in line, they may feel justified in being immoral in their future behaviors (Conway & Peetz, 2012). Additionally, the idea of moral identity is rooted in a Western cultural context that values individualism, like many other psychological concepts (Henrich et al., 2010), and more research is required because most studies have been done in the context of Western cultures and very few in collectivist cultures (Hertz & Krettenauer, 2016).

## **1.5. Present Study**

### **1.5.1. Aim and importance of the research**

Throughout history, many disciplines have studied how moral judgments are composed and what can elicit them, and these topics have become crucial. Furthermore, in social psychology, morality has emerged as one of the most extensively studied recent subjects (Ellemers, 2017). It is necessary to comprehend what influences moral judgment and decision-making and how various elements influence it. Besides, it is essential to replicate studies performed in many cultural contexts, especially in light of the impact of culture on moral behavior.

While cognitive effects that influence decision-making have had a revolutionary impact on the literature, a new area of study has focused on whether these cognitive heuristics effects are equally effective in moral decision-making and judgment procedures. The anchoring is one of the cognitive effects. An abundance of studies proves that the anchoring effect, a cognitive process, affects judgments. Remarkably, limited research has been done to determine if moral judgment is correspondingly affected by this effect. Therefore, one of the aims of this study is to examine the effect of anchoring on moral judgment.

On the other hand, in the psychology of morality research, the effect of moral identity on behavior has been the subject of many investigations, and moral identity can play a preventive role in engaging in immoral behavior. This research suggests that moral identity may play a role in the "anchoring effect" that forms cognitive distortions and leads to altered answers. It is shown that moral identity will enable a person to cognitively access morally relevant schemas effortlessly and play a role in being affected by contextual biases. Moreover, there has been no research on how moral identity may influence the anchoring of bias on moral judgment.

In addition, this research aims to examine the relationship between the tendency towards utilitarianism, one aspect of sacrificial dilemmas, and the degree to which the moral identity finds the scenarios appropriate and to obtain more comprehensive results by examining utilitarianism with these moral dilemma scenarios.

### **1.5.2. Hypotheses**

The following statements serve as the research's hypotheses:

Hypothesis 1: The percentage of moral appropriateness differs across anchoring manipulation groups. The highest mean percentage is obtained in the high anchoring group, and the lowest mean percentage is obtained in the low anchoring group.

Hypothesis 2: The percentage of moral appropriateness differs in low and high moral internalization identity groups. The highest mean is obtained in the low moral internalization identity group, and the lowest mean is obtained in the high moral internalization identity group.

Hypothesis 3: There is no interaction effect between the mean scores in the high and low moral identity internalization groups and the mean scores in the levels of anchoring effect manipulation.

Hypothesis 4: Utilitarianism tendency scores and moral identity internalization scores predict the degree to which participants who are not exposed to the anchoring effect find the scenarios morally appropriate.

## **2. METHOD**

### **2.1. Participants**

The ages of the sample ranged from 18 to 65. A priori analysis was performed in the G-Power Software 3.1 to calculate the exact total number of participants. When the effect size is medium ( $d = .25$ ),  $p < .05$ , and the estimation of power is .95; the calculated total participant number is 251. In the beginning, data was gathered from 331 people. Since 78 participants did not respond correctly to the manipulation control question, which was aimed at checking whether the participants in the study had read and understood the behavioral descriptions, these 78 participants were excluded. Accordingly, a total of 253 participants got involved in the study.

### **2.2. Materials**

#### **2.2.1. Informed consent form**

Informed consent form (including participants' right, details about the scope of the research and the confidentiality principle regarding the data to be obtained) was presented to the participants before starting the research. However, due to the possibility of influencing the participants' answers, it was not stated in the informed consent form that the research was specifically about morality and the detailed purpose of the study (Appendix 1).

#### **2.2.2. Demographic information form**

A demographic information form was presented to the participants to gather information about age, gender, job, educational background, previous experience with neurological/psychiatric disorders, and level of religiosity (Appendix 2).

#### **2.2.3. Classical moral dilemmas**

Kumova and Bahçekapılı (2020) investigated the moral dilemma scenarios that create high dilemmas in Turkish participants by selecting 20 scenarios among the moral dilemma scenarios most utilized in the studies of Greene et al. (2001), Koeing et al. (2007) and Moore et al. (2008). They conducted frequency and percentage analysis of the 'yes' (utilitarian) and 'no' (deontological) answers given to the scenarios. In the literature, to the extent that

deontological/utilitarian decision-making frequencies approach each other, the scenarios in question are considered 'high dilemma' scenarios to separate different decision-making tendencies (Koenigs et al., 2007).

Kumova and Bahçekapılı (2020) found that 'Nobel Prize,' 'Medicine,' 'Enemy Spy,' and 'Euthanasia' scenarios were the scenarios that caused the highest dilemma among the 20 scenarios they examined (Appendix 3). All of the mentioned scenarios are impersonal and do not involve personal interest. After each scenario, participants are asked whether a utilitarian decision is morally right. Participants 'yes' answer is considered an indicator of utilitarian decision-making tendency, and the 'no' answer is considered an indicator of deontological decision-making tendency. However, in this study, participants were asked about the degree of appropriateness of the given moral dilemmas. The researchers use different types of wording in moral judgment: such as "wrong", "inappropriate", "forbidden", or "blameworthy" (O'Hara et al., 2010). In moral dilemma questions, the participants were asked to indicate with 'more' or 'less' answers instead of 'yes' or 'no' formats to form questions parallel to questions used in the anchoring effect question structure.

#### **2.2.4. Anchoring manipulation**

Based on four classic moral dilemma scenarios, participants were asked whether the degree of moral appropriateness of the scenario from their perspective was greater or less than the numerical value determined by the conditions to which they were assigned. Anchor manipulation was then examined at 75% in the high anchor level group, 25% in the low anchor level group, and no anchor group where no numerical value was given. High anchor level (75%), low anchor level (25%), and no anchor level were randomly distributed among participants (Appendix 4). The mean values of the percentage values given by the participants in the four classical moral dilemma scenarios were determined as the overall moral approval percentage of the participants (Appendix 4).

#### **2.2.5. Oxford utilitarianism scale**

The Oxford Utilitarianism Scale (OUS) was developed by Kahane et al. (2018) to measure utilitarian decision-making tendencies. The scale comprises two dimensions and nine items: four are instrumental harm (disregarding any principle, which comprises not harming an innocent person, when the benefit of the vast majority is at stake) and five are

impartial beneficence (the tendency towards maximizing the benefit of the majority in an impartial manner, regardless of whether one has a personal relationship with the people involved). The scale is a 7-point Likert scale (1: Strongly disagree, 7: Strongly agree). A separate total score for each of the scale's dimensions can be calculated in addition to the scale's overall score. Higher scores on the scale signify a higher tendency for providing utilitarian evaluations (Kahane et al., 2018). There are no items to be reverse scored.

The scale's adaptation to Turkish is made by Kumova and Bahçekapılı (2021). As a result of the factor analysis applied, the scale was evaluated as "impartial beneficence" (1, 3, 5, 7, 9) and "instrumental harm" (2, 4, 6, 8). For the Turkish version, the factor loadings of the items ranged between .54 and .85. The split-half reliability coefficient of the impartial beneficence dimension of the scale was found to be .72 and the split-half reliability coefficient of the instrumental harm dimension was found to be .76 (Appendix 5).

#### **2.2.6. Moral identity scale**

This scale was developed by Aquino and Reed (2002) to evaluate how important moral identity is to an individuals'self. The scale is a 7-point Likert-type scale consisting of 10 items (1: Strongly disagree, 7: Strongly agree) and two dimensions (internalization and symbolization). The symbolization dimension of moral identity scale represents the behavioral characteristics that are put into practice by influencing others, whereas the internalization sub-dimension indicates the adoption of moral schemas formed in the mind as identity traits. Each dimension of the scale is scored on its own and high scores from each sub-dimension of the scale indicate that the individual has the trait assessed by the relevant sub-dimension. The fourth and seventh internalization dimension items are reverse coded during the scoring procedure since they are negative items of the scale.

The validity and reliability study of the scale was conducted by Yılmaz and Yılmaz (2016) (Appendix 6). As a result of the factor analysis, the scale was evaluated as "internalization" (1, 2, 4, 7, 10) and "symbolization" (3, 5, 6, 8, 9). According to confirmatory factor analysis, factor loadings ranged between 0.48 and 0.75 . The Cronbach's alpha internal consistency coefficient was .77 for the internalization subscale and .76 for the symbolization subscale. The internalization sub-dimension of the moral identity scale was employed in this study as it is more closely associated with cognitive processes and includes moral concepts and schemas in the mind.

### **2.2.7. Manipulation check question**

An instructional attention check assignment consisting of one item was provided to participants to ensure that they had read and comprehended the behavioral descriptions properly (Oppenheimer et al., 2009; Gawronski et al., 2017). Individuals who did not adhere to the guidelines were excluded from the analysis (Appendix 7).

### **2.2.8. Debriefing form**

The participants were presented with a debriefing form after the study, which included information on the fundamental purpose and scope of the research (Appendix 8).

## **2.3. Procedure**

Before beginning the data collection process for the research, ethical approval was obtained from the Başkent University Social and Human Sciences Ethics Committee. Then, the study was carried out. Participants completed the questionnaire through "Qualtrics Survey Software". Respondents were asked to confirm their informed consent before starting the study. Initially, all participants were randomly assigned to the high anchor (75%), low anchor (25%), and no anchor conditions. Participants in the anchor manipulation group were asked to read a moral dilemma scenario in which they would be asked whether it is more or less morally appropriate than 25% or 75% to engage in a utilitarian behavior for the benefit of the greater good (e.g., causing the death of a wounded soldier by doing the relevant programming on your computer to prevent him from giving classified information to the enemy under torture). Participants in the non-anchor group were asked, without any numerical value, whether it was more or less morally appropriate to engage in utilitarian behavior to benefit the many in the moral dilemma scenario they had just read. For the low anchor condition, respondents were asked to answer "more" or "less" to these questions. Then, for each of the three groups (high anchor, low anchor, no anchor group), they were further instructed to indicate in percentage the degree of moral appropriateness of the above moral dilemma scenario for them. After the moral dilemma scenarios, participants completed either the "Oxford Utilitarianism Scale" or the "Moral Identity Scale" in a randomized order. In a subsequent step, a question was added as a manipulation check to ensure that the participants followed the instructions and read the given scenarios; participants who did not

provide the required answers to these questions were excluded from the study. Finally, participants were asked to complete the demographic information form, and the study ended.

Since the participants were exposed to manipulation, they were informed about the study's purpose and provided with an explanation at the end of the study.

#### 2.4. Design & Statistical Analyses

There are two independent variables and one dependent variable in this study. The independent variables of the research are anchoring (high-anchor, low-anchor, and no-anchor) and moral identity (high-moral internalization and low-moral internalization). The dependent variables are the percentage of moral appropriateness mean scores in classical moral dilemma scenarios. The design of the present study is a 3x2 between-subject factorial design. The study's design is shown in Figure 2.1.

Analyses were carried out using IBM SPSS Statistics 26.0. The effect of anchor (high, low, and no-anchor) on the percentage of moral appropriateness mean scores in classical moral dilemma scenarios was examined with the Analysis of Variance (ANOVA). The same test was also run to investigate the effect of moral identity and the interaction effect of anchor effect and moral identity on the percentage of moral appropriateness in dilemmas. Regression analysis was conducted to examine whether utilitarian tendency scores and moral identity internalization scores predicted the degree to which they found the classical moral scenarios morally appropriate in participants not exposed to the anchor effect.

Figure 2.1. Design of the study

		<b>Anchor Condition</b>		
		High-anchor	Low-anchor	No-anchor
<b>Moral internalization</b>	High	Mean score 1	Mean Score 2	Mean Score 3
	Low	Mean Score 4	Mean Score 5	Mean Score 6

### 3. RESULTS

There are two independent variables and one dependent variables in this research. The independent variables of research are anchoring effect (high anchor, low anchor, no anchor) and moral identity internalization (high moral identity internalization and low moral identity internalization). The mean score of percentage of moral appropriateness is dependent variable. ANOVA analysis were conducted as main analysis. With this statistical analysis, it were aimed to show main effects of each independent variable and interaction between independent variables on the dependent variable. Additionally, regression analysis were conducted to examine whether utilitarian tendency scores and moral identity internalization scores predict the degree to which they find the scenarios morally appropriate in participants who were not exposed to the anchor effect.

#### 3.1. Descriptive Statistics

The number of people who participated in this study was 331. Firstly, the study excluded 78 participants who did not answer the manipulation control question correctly, so the analysis was performed on 253 people.

Before the statistical analyses, the data were checked for the presence of any univariate and multivariate outliers, and no outlier was detected. Subsequently, normality analysis was performed and the variables of this study, the mean scores of the percentage of moral appropriateness (skewness: -0.40 kurtosis: -0.36), moral identity internalization scores (skewness: -0.89 kurtosis: -0.01) and oxford utilitarianism scale scores (skewness: -0.27 kurtosis: -0.47) were examined. When the data were analyzed, it was observed that the data were normally distributed based on skewness and kurtosis values ( $> -1.5$  or  $< +1.5$ ; Tabachnick & Fidell, 2013).

Descriptive statistic analyses were performed after the normal distribution criteria were met. The research sample consisted of 253 people between the ages of 18-65 ( $M= 37.78$ ,  $SD= 10.03$ ). Among the 253 participants, 157 persons indicated their gender as "female" (62.1%), 90 persons as "male" (35.6%), 5 persons as "do not want to specify" (2%) and 1 person as "other" (0.4%). The educational status of the participants varied as secondary school ( $N= 14$ , 5.5%), high school ( $N= 25$ , 9.9%), undergraduate ( $N= 174$ , 68.8%), master's degree ( $N= 36$ , 14.2%), doctorate ( $N= 4$ , 1.6%). In order to analyze the religiosity levels of

the participants, a question was asked on a 9-point scale ranging from "not at all religious" to "very religious", one person did not answer the question, and the mean of 252 participants was calculated as 6.26 ( $SD= 2.19$ ). The thirty-two of the participants (12.6%) stated that they had previously suffered from a neurological/psychiatric disorder. The frequencies and descriptive statistics of demographic variables are shown Table 3.1.

Table 3. 1. Frequencies and Descriptive Statistics of Demographic Variables (N=253)

Variables	Frequency	%	<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>
<b>Gender</b>				
Female	157	62.1		
Male	90	35.6		
Don't want to specify	5	2		
Other	1	0.4		
<b>Education</b>				
Secondary School	14	5.5		
High School	25	9.9		
Undergrauate	174	68.8		
Master's Degree	36	14.2		
Doctorate	4	1.6		
<b>N/P Disorder Past</b>				
Yes	32	12.6		
No	221	87.4		
<b>Age</b>			37.78	10.03
<b>Religiosity</b>			6.26	2.19

Note. N/P= Neurological/Psychiatric

### 3.2. Correlation Analysis for Investigated Research Variables

Correlation analysis was performed to examine the relationship between the variables investigated in the study and the results are shown in Table 3.2.

According to the correlation analysis, the mean scores of the percentage of moral appropriateness positively correlated with utilitarianism tendency scores (OUS) ( $r = .34, p < .01$ ), impartial beneficence (one of the sub-dimensions of utilitarianism tendency) (OUS-IB) ( $r = .18, p < 0.01$ ), and instrumental harm (the other sub-dimension of utilitarianism tendency) (OUS-IH) ( $r = .40, p < .01$ ).

The utilitarian tendency scores positively correlated with impartial beneficence (OUS-IB) ( $r = .85, p < 0.01$ ), instrumental harm (OUS-IH) ( $r = .78, p < 0.01$ ), and the moral identity internalization (MI-I) ( $r = .13, p < .05$ ).

In addition, the impartial beneficence (OUS-IB) positively correlated with instrumental harm (OUS-IH) ( $r = .35, p < .01$ ), and moral identity internalization (MI-I) ( $r = .21, p < .01$ ).

Table 3. 2. Correlations of Study Variables

	1	2	3	4	5
1. MI-I	1				
2. OUS	.131*	1			
3. OUS-IB	.211**	.858**	1		
4. OUS-IH	-.017	.784**	.354**	1	
5. PMA	.013	.340**	.180**	.403**	1

Notes. MI-I=Moral Identity Internalization, OUS= Oxford Utilitarianism Scale, OUS-IB=Oxford Utilitarianism Impartial Beneficence, OUS-IH= Oxford Utilitarianism Instrumental Harm, PMA= Percentage of Moral Appropriateness, \* $p < .05$ , \*\* $p < .01$

### 3.3. Inferential Statistics

Before carrying out the analysis, median split analysis was applied to categorize the scores obtained from the moral identity internalization scale as high and low moral identity internalization. The median value over the obtained scores was calculated as 30, and the scores above 30 were divided into groups as high moral identity internalization ( $N= 122$ ), and the scores of 30 and below were divided into groups as low moral identity internalization ( $N= 131$ ). Then, a two-way ANOVA analysis were conducted.


Regarding *the first hypothesis*, the effect of anchoring (high anchor, low anchor, no anchor) were analyzed. The main effect of anchoring was significant ( $F(2,247)= 12.198, p < .001, \eta^2 = .898$ ) and the levels of the anchoring effect (high, low, no) differed on the mean scores of moral appropriateness percentage (See Figure 3.1.). The pairwise comparison for the main effect of anchoring based on post-hoc test demonstrated that the high anchor group ( $M= 68.00$ ) significantly found sacrificial dilemmas as morally appropriate than the low anchor ( $M= 53.01, p < .001$ ) and the no anchor group ( $M= 58.32, p < .01$ ). Also, the no anchor group ( $M= 58,32$ ) significantly differed from the high anchor group ( $M= 68.00, p < .01$ ). But, the low anchor group ( $M= 53,01$ ) didn't significantly differ from the no anchor group ( $M= 58,32$ ).

The main effect of the moral internalization score (high moral internalization and low moral identity internalization) was analyzed according to *the second hypothesis*. There is no significant main effect of the moral internalization scores on the mean score of percentage of moral appropriateness.

The interaction effect of two independent variables on the mean score of percentage of moral appropriateness was analyzed for *the third hypothesis*. It was found that there is

statistically no significant interaction effect between the the levels of anchoring effect and the levels of moral identity internalization. The results are shown in Table 3.3.

Figure 3. 1. Mean Scores of the Moral Appropriateness Percentage for the Groups



Note. \*\* $p < .01$ , \*\*\* $p < .001$

Table 3. 3. Two-Way ANOVA Results Table for Anchoring Effect and Moral Identity Internalization on the Percentage of Moral Appropriateness

Source	<i>df</i>	<i>Mean Square</i>	<i>F</i>	<i>p</i>	$\eta^2$
The conditions of anchoring	2	5049.756	12.198	.000***	.090
High and low MI-I	1	124.924	.302	.583	.001
The conditions of anchoring x High and low MI-I	2	554.939	1.340	.264	.011
Error	247	413.997			

Note. MI-I= Moral Identity Internalization, \*\*\* $p < .001$

### 3.4. Regression Analysis

A hierarchical regression analysis was conducted to test *the fourth hypotheses*. The aim was to investigate the extent to which utilitarianism disposition (the total score on the Oxford Utilitarianism Scale) and moral identity internalization (the total score on the Moral Identity Internalization Scale) predicted moral appropriateness in participants who were not

exposed to the anchor effect. It was also examined in this hierarchical analysis whether participants' scores of religiosity and gender predict the percentage of moral appropriateness. First, utilitarianism tendency was included in the first step of this equation. In the second step, the moral identity internalization equation was included. In the third step, religiosity was included in equation. Finally, in the fourth step, gender was included in equation. The total variance explained by all variables in the dependent variable is 12%. Utilitarianism tendency in the first equation explained 10.3% of the variance ( $F(1, 82)= 9.41, p < .01$ ). Then, when the second variable, moral identity internalization, was added to the equation, the variance explained was 11.1% of the equation ( $F(2, 81)= 5.06, p < .01$ ). In the third step, when the religiosity was added to the equation, it explained 11.5% of the variance ( $F(3, 80)= 3.47, p < .05$ ). In the fourth step, the gender explained 12% of the variance ( $F(4,79)= 2,70, p < .05$ ). Moreover, in total, utilitarianism tendency ( $\beta= .321, t(82)= 3.068, p < .01$ ) predicted the dependent variable significantly, while moral identity internalization ( $\beta= -.090, t(81)= -.861, p= .392$ ) did not predict the dependent variable significantly. Besides, religiosity ( $\beta= -.063, t(80)= -.603, p= .548$ ) and gender ( $\beta= -.072, t(79)= -.664, p= .509$ ) did not predict the moral appropriateness percentage. The results are shown Table 3.4.

In addition, the extent to which the Oxford Utilitarianism Scale's sub-dimensions “impartial beneficence” and “instrumental harm” separately predict the mean score of moral appropriateness was analyzed by multiple regression. The overall model was found significant in terms of predicting the percentage of moral appropriateness ( $F(2,82)= 6.66, p < .01, R^2= .12$ ). The instrumental harm ( $\beta= .35, t(82)= 3.19, p < .01$ ) significantly predicted the percentage of moral appropriateness. In contrast, beneficial impartiality ( $\beta= .47, t(82)= .42, p= .675$ ) was not evaluated as a significant predictor of the percentage of moral appropriateness.

Table 3. 4. Regression Analysis Results

Variables	$R^2$	$\Delta R^2$	$F$	$\beta$	$p$
<b>Model 1</b>	.103	.103	9.412		.001
OUS-S				.321	.003**
<b>Model 2</b>	.111	.008	5.062		.005
MI-I				-.090	.392
<b>Model 3</b>	.115	.004	3.469		.005
Religiosity				-.063	.548

<b>Model 4</b>	.120	.005	2.694		.005
Gender				-.072	.509

---

*Note. OUS-S= Oxford Utilitarianism Scale Scores, MI-I= Moral Identity Internalization, \*\*p< .01*

## 4. DISCUSSION

This study examines the effect of anchoring and moral identity internalization on moral decision-making and judgment, as well as whether moral identity internalization and utilitarian thinking tendency predict people's evaluation of moral dilemma scenarios as morally appropriate. In this framework, it was hypothesized that the anchoring effect and moral identity internalization would affect the percentage of people finding sacrificial dilemmas morally appropriate. The results showed that anchoring had a main effect on the percentage of people finding classical moral dilemmas morally appropriate. In contrast, moral identity had no main effect on the percentage of people finding these dilemmas morally appropriate. Moreover, no interaction effect was found between the anchoring effect and moral identity internalization. Additionally, it was hypothesized that the moral identity internalization and utilitarian thinking tendencies of the participants not exposed to the anchoring manipulation would predict whether they find the dilemma scenarios morally appropriate. According to the results, it was demonstrated that while utilitarian tendency predicted the percentage of finding sacrificial dilemma scenarios morally appropriate, moral identity did not predict the percentage of finding them morally appropriate.

### 4.1. The Anchoring Effect

The findings of this study are consistent with the existing literature on anchoring and also suggest that anchoring has a main effect on judgment in the moral domain. These results may lead us to infer that the anchoring effect can be extended to moral judgment.

The manipulation of the anchor numerical values in the sacrificial moral dilemmas given to the participants affected the participants' preference for utilitarianism, which is the state of taking action to harm for the benefit of the majority given in the dilemma. That is, the participants in the high anchor group (the group exposed to 75% numerical value) differed from the participants in the low anchor group (the group exposed to 25% numerical value) and the no anchor group, which was not exposed to any numerical value. The high anchor group was more likely to favor the utilitarianism stated in the dilemmas and reported a higher percentage of moral appropriateness for the given act of harm. However, the degree of moral appropriateness stated by the participants in the low anchor group in the sacrificial dilemma scenarios and the percentage of moral appropriateness stated by the no anchor group exposed to any numerical value did not differ significantly.

It is also understood that individuals' moral values and judgments may differentiate by being influenced by the anchoring effect, as in other cognitive effects (Broader, 2011; Meyer et al., 2019; Tanner et al., 2008). In line with previous results, it was demonstrated that the anchoring effect to which participants are exposed may play a role in people's predictions, even if it is not informative about the subject they would make judgments on (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974). Also, anchoring values can influence the extent to which people perceive moral dilemmas as permissible (Brand & Oaksford, 2015). The anchoring effect has been found to play a role in people's judgments by making the ability to engage in harming behavior in dilemmas more permissible and acceptable.

Furthermore, the effect of anchoring is reported to be significantly more prominent in the absence of other signaling (Kahneman, 1992) when the uncertainty of the subject to which the person is exposed to the anchor increases and the relevance of the context for the person decreases (Van Exel et al., 2006). This explanation may be another possible reason for the anchoring effect observed in the participants. As in this study, research on moral judgment frequently employs dilemmas that involve conundrum situations in which people are caught between two situations and are unable to attain the right answer immediately, and since the participants may not be very relevant to the issues in these dilemma scenarios, this ambiguity in sacrificial dilemmas may have caused the participants to be more affected by high anchor.

On the other hand, the findings that there was no significant difference between the participants in the low anchor group and the participants in the no anchor group were in accordance with the findings of Hysenbelli et al.'s (2013) study on the effect of anchoring on charitable giving. However, the reason why there was no significant difference between the participants who were exposed to the low anchor group and the participants who were not exposed to anchoring in this study may be the limited numerical value that the participants could indicate. Generally, there is no restriction for the numerical anchor value given in previous studies, whereas, in this study, the responses of the low and no anchor groups may not have differed significantly due to the fact that the participants could indicate their moral approval with a value between 1 and 100 as a percentage and this range was very limited and narrow.

## **4.2. The Moral Identity**

This research revealed that the variable of moral identity internalization (high moral identity internalization and low moral identity internalization groups) had no effect on the percentage of finding the behaviors in the moral dilemma morally appropriate. In other words, having high moral identity internalization or having low moral identity internalization did not lead to a significant difference in the degree to which the participants would harm for the benefit of the majority given in the dilemma. It was further shown that moral identity internalization did not have any interaction effect with the anchoring effect, which was shown to have a main effect on moral dilemmas.

A study using classical sacrificial moral dilemmas indicated that moral identity (both moral identity internalization and moral identity symbolization) did not independently influence moral behavior but instead showed a moderator effect on moral judgment and that moral identity internalization (which was also used in this study) showed a more robust moderator effect than the symbolization sub-dimension of moral identity. (Reynolds & Ceranic, 2007). According to Glenn et al. (2010), the changes in moral judgments do not emerge with the effect of moral identity. In light of these findings, it can be clarified why moral identity internalization does not have a main effect on moral judgment in this study. First of all, the fact that the dilemmas used in the study do not consist of a situation that can be easily and quickly judged as morally appropriate or wrong and contain ambiguity may not have enabled moral identity, which enables people to activate their moral values cognitively. Furthermore, people may be misled about what matters to them, their judgments of their own moral identities may not always align with their behaviors, and there may be a discrepancy between their thoughts and the actions they take (Hertz & Krettenauer, 2016). Even if people state that morality-related values specified in the scale of moral identity internalization are central to their selves, this may not be congruous with the moral conditions encountered in practical circumstances.

On the other hand, Reynold and Ceranic (2007) stated in their previous studies that moral behavior may arise due to the interaction of moral identity and moral judgment. Considering these results, it can be suggested that one reason no interaction effect occurred between the anchoring effect and moral identity internalization in this study may be that moral identity internalization is not a variable that independently affects moral judgment.

### **4.3. The Utilitarianism, Moral Identity, and Classical Moral Dilemmas**

It has been stated that contradictory findings regarding utilitarianism have been encountered in sacrificial moral dilemmas, which are predominantly used in morality-related research in psychology, and that in these moral dilemmas, the idea of utilitarianism is not considered as a whole, but only the negative aspect is focused on (Kahane et al., 2018). For this reason, in order to evaluate utilitarianism more comprehensively, in this research, the tendency of utilitarianism and the extent to which moral identity internalization predicts whether they will find moral dilemmas appropriate were examined on participants who were not exposed to anchoring manipulation. The results show that while the total scores on the utilitarianism scale (total scores from both the instrumental harm and impartial beneficence dimensions) predicted the degree to which participants would take an action of harm for the benefit of the majority given the dilemma, whereas moral identity internalization did not predict the percentage of participants who found it morally acceptable to engage in this act of harm. The explanation of why moral identity internalization was not predicted may be that, as mentioned above, it is not a variable that independently affects moral judgment (Reynold & Ceranic, 2007).

In addition, when the extent to which the sub-dimensions of utilitarianism predict moral approval percentage is examined separately, it was found that while instrumental harm predicts moral judgment on dilemmas, impartial beneficence alone does not predict moral judgment on dilemmas. These findings confirm the findings of previous studies, which are congruent with the findings of sacrificial dilemmas and focus on the instrumental harm aspect of utilitarian thinking. For this reason, in order to measure the utilitarian moral view more comprehensively, evaluating it together with the results obtained from the scales that address both the harm and harm dimensions of utilitarianism (Kumova & Bahçekapılı, 2021) may be a good method to obtain more accurate results in studies focusing on changes related to utilitarianism in the field of moral psychology.

### **4.4. Contributions, Limitations, and Directions for Future Studies**

The purpose of this study is to fill in the gaps in the literature by examining utilitarianism, moral identity, and anchoring—three significant contributions in the field of research on moral judgment and decision-making. First and foremost, it has been suggested that this research enhances the generalizability of the findings with the data reported from

the Turkish sample, given that moral judgments are strongly influenced by the prevalent emotions and cultural norms in the society in which people live (Shweder, 1991).

Furthermore, there are not sufficient examinations in the literature discussing how anchoring impacts moral judgment and decision-making. This study additionally contributes to the existing body of research on the extension of anchoring to the field of morality through the assessment of moral judgment using traditional sacrificial moral dilemmas.

Within the scope of this research, there are some limitations. Firstly, the research may be less representative, given that women comprise the majority of participants (62.1%). Furthermore, it is claimed that while the sacrificial moral dilemmas used in this study are a creative way of measuring moral judgment, their complexity prevents them from being applied to moral decisions that might arise in everyday life. Additionally, the research's generalizability is undermined by the absence of information regarding the people's identities in the dilemma scenarios (Hester & Gray, 2020), and it has drawn criticism for being unrealistic (Bauman et al., 2014). As a consequence of this, it is thought to be essential to examine moral judgment using different methods of evaluation (e.g., ultimatum games or moral vignettes that incorporate features that are more relevant to everyday life). Besides, since the study was done online, environmental changes that emerged during decision-making and judgment may have influenced the participants' responses, even if a manipulation question was used to demonstrate that the participants had read and comprehended the situations. Therefore, controlled research in a laboratory setting might be required.

Finally, the extent to which the findings may be generalized is limited owing to the insufficiency of research on the relationship between moral judgment, decision-making, and the anchoring effect. Thus, future studies looking into the mechanisms underlying the influence of anchoring on moral judgment are considered crucial to support the results of these studies.

## 5. CONCLUSION

The way that people categorize particular behaviors as "right" or "wrong" affects many aspects of life (Hofmann et al., 2014). The moral judgment and decision-making processes involved in this classification process are similarly highly complicated and susceptible to a wide range of influences. The primary goal of this research is to investigate the anchoring effect and moral identity in order to shed light on the differences in this judgment and decision-making process. Accordingly, moral judgment has been demonstrated to be impacted by the anchoring effect but not by the internalization of moral identities.

The research's conclusions indicate that moral judgments are influenced by the anchoring effect and that those who are exposed to greater anchor values have moral judgments that are both anchored and differentiated. When we consider the practical implications of the anchor effect in daily life, our shared groups may assist in shaping our values and clarify how they function as a social moral anchor (Ellemers & Van der Toorn, 2015). Correspondingly, there are many things in our society that we are exposed to, such as the legal system, prevailing political circumstances, and cultural norms in general, which could function as an "anchor" in our decision-making and judgment process. Because of this, it appears to be crucial to gain insight into the anchoring effect and how moral judgment and decision-making would evolve in practical fields like politics, law, medicine, and education.

Finally, it has been shown by this study that utilitarian moral reasoning solely represents the negative aspect of the sacrificial moral dilemmas utilized in studies on moral judgment and decision-making. It might provide more comprehensive results for studies that aim to investigate the utilitarian moral thinking system as a whole if classical moral dilemma scenarios are not used as the only measuring tool.

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## APPENDICES

### APPENDIX 1: INFORMED CONSENT FORM

#### Bilgilendirilmiş Onam Formu


Bu çalışma, Başkent Üniversitesi Sosyal Psikoloji Yüksek Lisans öğrencisi Psk. Betül AKKAYA tarafından Doç. Dr. Elvin DOĞUTEPE danışmanlığında yürütülmektedir. Çalışmanın amacı, karar alma ve yargıya varma süreçlerini etkileyen değişkenleri incelemektir. Bu çalışmayı tamamlamak yaklaşık olarak 15 dakika sürmektedir. Çalışmada anketleri doldurmanız ve verilen senaryoları okumanız beklenmektedir; ayrıca bu senaryolarla alakalı sorulara cevap vermeniz istenecektir.

Çalışmaya katılmak için ana dilinizin Türkçe olması, 18 yaşın üzerinde olmanız gerekmektedir. Araştırmada göreceğiniz soruların ve ifadelerin, **doğru ya da yanlış cevabı bulunmamaktadır**. Bu araştırma gönüllüğe dayanmaktadır, istediğiniz anda araştırmadan çekilebilirsiniz. Herhangi bir kimlik bilgisi gerekmemektedir, hem kimliğiniz hem de cevaplarınız anonim olarak ve etik kurallara göre muhafaza edilecektir.

Bu çalışmaya katılımınız için çok teşekkür ederiz, araştırmaya veya araştırma sürecine dair sorularınız için [b\\*\\*\\*@gmail.com](mailto:b***@gmail.com) adresinden araştırmacıya ulaşabilirsiniz.

Yukarıda belirtilen ifadeleri okudum ve çalışmaya katılmayı kabul ediyorum.

Katılıyorum



## APPENDIX 2: DEMOGRAPHIC INFORMATION FORM

### 1. Cinsiyetiniz:

Kadın ( ) Erkek ( ) Transseksüel ( ) Diğer ( ) Belirtmek İstemiyorum ( )

### 2. Doğum yılınız: .....

### 3. En son mezun olduğunuz okul derecesini belirtiniz:

İlkokul-ortaokul mezunu: ( )

Lise mezunu: ( )

Lisans/ Önlisans: ( )

Yüksek lisans: ( )

Doktora: ( )

### 4. Mesleğinizi belirtiniz: .....

### 5. Daha önce herhangi bir nörolojik/psikiyatrik rahatsızlık geçirdiniz mi?

Evet ( ) Hayır ( )

Cevabınız evet ise rahatsızlığınızın ne olduğunu belirtiniz:

### 6. Kendinizi dindarlık açısından nerede tanımlarsınız?

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10  
○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○  
Hiç dindar değil Oldukça Dindar

### **APPENDIX 3: CLASSICAL MORAL DILEMMAS**

Lütfen aşağıdaki senaryoların her birini okuyup ilgili soruları yanıtlayın, yanıt seçeneklerinden sadece seçtiğiniz bir tanesini yuvarlak içine alın. Lütfen tüm anketi ara vermeden tek bir oturumda tamamlayın. Tüm araştırma süresince ve sonrasında cevapların gizliliği korunacak, kişi bazlı her hangi bir değerlendirme yapılmayacak, tüm katılımcıların genel eğilimleri değerlendirilecektir.

#### ***1-NOBEL ÖDÜLÜ:***

Siz ve araştırma ortağınız, güvenli, ucuz ve doğayı kirletmeyen yeni bir enerji kaynağı keşfettiniz. Bu keşif, dünyadaki çevre kirliliğini ve yoksulluğu ortadan kaldıracabilecek boyutta bir keşif ancak, ortağınız bu keşfi satmak istiyor.

Ortağınızı iyi tanıyorsunuz ve onun bu keşfi en yüksek fiyatı veren kim olursa olsun ona satmak isteyeceğinden eminsiniz. Ortağınızın bugün bu keşfi korkunç bir silah olarak kullanmayı deneyecek birkaç potansiyel alıcı ile görüşeceğini ve bu kişilerin ortağınıza hayalinden bile geçmeyecek miktarda yüksek bir para önereceğini öğrendiniz. Bu kişiler keşfinizi ele geçirirlerse, bunu son derece tehlikeli bir silah yapımında kullanacaklar ve binlerce insanın ölümüne neden olacaklar.

Ortağınızın bu satışı yapmasını engellemek için tek yolunuz onu öldürmek. Laboratuvarda bulunan kokusuz ve renksiz yanıcı bir kimyasalı laboratuvara dökerseniz, sigara tiryakisi ortağınızın çakmağını çaktığında havaya uçacağını biliyorsunuz. Böylece herkes bunun bir laboratuvar kazası olduğunu düşünecek ve keşfiniz de bunu silah olarak kullanabilecek kişilerin eline düşmemiş olacak.

Çakmağı çaktığında ortağınızın ölümüne neden olacak olan kimyasalı laboratuvara dökerek bu yeni enerji kaynağının, onu silah olarak kullanacak kişilerin eline düşmesini ve binlerce kişinin ölümünü önlemek, sizin açınızdan ahlaken doğru mudur?

Evet / Hayır

#### ***2- ÖTANAZİ:***

Küçük bir askeri birliği komuta ediyorsunuz. Düşman bölgesindeki görevinizi tamamlayıp dönerken, adamlarınızdan biri düşman tarafından kurulmuş kapanlardan birine basıyor ve bacağı kötü şekilde yaralanıyor. Onu kan kaybından öldürmeden bacağı kapandan kurtarmanız mümkün değil. Ancak onu ardınızda bırakırsanız da düşman birlikleri onu bulup konuşturmak için öldürene kadar işkence edecekler. Yaralı asker de en sonunda işkenceye dayanamayıp gizli bilgileri düşmana verecek. Siz bu gece farklı bir bölgeye göreve

gideceğiniz için risk altında değilsiniz. Ancak yaralı askerin düşmana vereceği gizli bilgilerin onlarca askerin ölümüne neden olacağını biliyorsunuz.

Düşman birlikleri yaklaştığı için yaralı askerin yanında daha fazla kalmanız mümkün değil. Askerinizin yerini bilgisayarınızda bombalama hedefi olarak programlamanız ve bulunduğu yerin bombalanmasını sağlamanız mümkün.

İşkence altında düşmana gizli bilgileri vermesini önlemek için, bilgisayarınızda ilgili programlamayı yaparak yaralı askerin ölümüne neden olmak, sizin açınızdan ahlaken doğru mudur?

Evet / Hayır

### **3- DÜŞMAN CASUSU:**

Savaş sırasında askeri bir birliğin komutanısınız. Askerleriniz, kısmen çöken bir binada oluşan bir çukurda aranan önemli bir düşman casusunu ağır yaralı olarak ele geçirdiler. Telsizden birliğinize, düşman askerlerinin yakındaki çok sayıdaki kasabadan birine sürpriz bir saldırı düzenleyecekleri bilgisi geldi. Eğer müdahale edemezseniz, düşman askerleri saldırdıkları kasabadaki tüm sivilleri öldürecekler. Ancak hangi kasabaya saldıracıklarını bilmiyorsunuz.

Ele geçirilen yaralı düşman casusunun hangi kasabaya saldırı planlandığını bildiğine eminsiniz. Onu sorguladınız ancak bilgi vermeyi kesinlikle ret ediyor. Casusun er ya da geç aldığı yaralar nedeni ile öleceğini biliyorsunuz.

Sorgulama sırasında casusun bulunduğu çukur, binanın temelinden yükselen su ile dolmaya başladı. Su casusun boyun hizasına kadar geliyor, kısa süre sonra boyunu aşacak ve casus boğulacak. İsteddiğiniz bilgileri vermezse onu orada bırakacağınızı söyleyerek konuşmaya zorlayabilirsiniz. Casusu bu şekilde ölüme terk ederseniz son anda istediğiniz bilgileri vereceğine eminsiniz, ancak bu aşamada onu kurtarma imkanınızın kalmayacağını da biliyorsunuz. Casus boğularak ölecek, ancak siz de bu sayede düşmanın hangi kasabaya saldıracığını öğrenebilecek ve yüzlerce masumun hayatını kurtarabileceksiniz.

Yüzlerce masum hayatı kurtarabilmek için casusu boğularak ölüme terk etmek, sizin açınızdan ahlaken doğru mudur?

Evet / Hayır

### **4- İLAÇ:**

Sağlık Bakanlığında üst düzey bir yöneticisiniz. Bir şehirdeki yüzlerce insan ölümcül bir hastalığa yakalandılar. Yeni üretilen bir ilacın kullanılmaya başlamasına ilişkin karar

vereceksiniz. Bu ilaç, ilgili bölgedeki ölümcül hastalığı başarı ile tedavi edebiliyor. Ancak ilacın aynı zamanda ciddi yan etkileri var. İlacın hastalara verilmesi durumunda hastaların çoğu iyileşecek, fakat küçük bir grup hasta da ilacın yan etkileri nedeni ile ölecek.

Bu ilacın ölümcül hastalığa yakalanan ilgili hastalara verilmesine karar vermek, sizin açınızdan ahlaken doğru mudur?

Evet / Hayır

## APPENDIX 4: ANCHORING MANIPULATION

### Manipulation Group (High Anchor)

#### *NOBEL ÖDÜLÜ:*

Siz ve araştırma ortağınız, güvenli, ucuz ve doğayı kirletmeyen yeni bir enerji kaynağı keşfettiniz. Bu keşif, dünyadaki çevre kirliliğini ve yoksulluğu ortadan kaldırabilecek boyutta bir keşif ancak, ortağınız bu keşfi satmak istiyor.

Ortağınızı iyi tanıyorsunuz ve onun bu keşfi en yüksek fiyatı veren kim olursa olsun ona satmak isteyeceğinden eminsiniz. Ortağınızın bugün bu keşfi korkunç bir silah olarak kullanmayı deneyecek birkaç potansiyel alıcı ile görüşeceğini ve bu kişilerin ortağınıza hayalinden bile geçmeyecek miktarda yüksek bir para önereceğini öğrendiniz. Bu kişiler keşfinizi ele geçirirlerse, bunu son derece tehlikeli bir silah yapımında kullanacaklar ve binlerce insanın ölümüne neden olacaklar.

Ortağınızın bu satışı yapmasını engellemek için tek yolunuz onu öldürmek. Laboratuvarında bulunan kokusuz ve renksiz yanıcı bir kimyasalı laboratuvara dökerseniz, sigara tiryakisi ortağınızın çakmağını çaktığında havaya uçacağını biliyorsunuz. Böylece herkes bunun bir laboratuvar kazası olduğunu düşünecek ve keşfiniz de bunu silah olarak kullanabilecek kişilerin eline düşmemiş olacak.

Çakmağı çaktığında ortağınızın ölümüne neden olacak olan kimyasalı laboratuvara dökerek bu yeni enerji kaynağının, onu silah olarak kullanacak kişilerin eline düşmesini ve binlerce kişinin ölümünü önlemek, sizin açınızdan ahlaki uygunluk derecesi %75'ten fazla mıdır yoksa az mıdır?

Fazla / Az

Sizin düşüncenize göre, çakmağı çaktığında ortağınızın ölümüne neden olacak olan kimyasalı laboratuvara dökerek bu yeni enerji kaynağının, onu silah olarak kullanacak kişilerin eline düşmesini ve binlerce kişinin ölümünü önlemenin ahlaki uygunluk derecesi % kaçtır?



#### *ÖTANAZİ:*

Küçük bir askeri birliği komuta ediyorsunuz. Düşman bölgesindeki görevinizi tamamlayıp dönerken, adamlarınızdan biri düşman tarafından kurulmuş kapanlardan birine basıyor ve bacağı kötü şekilde yaralanıyor. Onu kan kaybından öldürmeden bacağını kapandan

kurtarmanız mümkün değil. Ancak onu ardınızda bırakırsanız da düşman birlikleri onu bulup konuşurmak için öldürene kadar işkence edecekler. Yaralı asker de en sonunda işkenceye dayanamayıp gizli bilgileri düşmana verecek. Siz bu gece farklı bir bölgeye göreve gideceğiniz için risk altında değilsiniz. Ancak yaralı askerin düşmana vereceği gizli bilgilerin onlarca askerin ölümüne neden olacağını biliyorsunuz.

Düşman birlikleri yaklaştığı için yaralı askerin yanında daha fazla kalmanız mümkün değil. Askerinizin yerini bilgisayarınızda bombalama hedefi olarak programlamanız ve bulunduğu yerin bombalanmasını sağlamanız mümkün.

İşkence altında düşmana gizli bilgileri vermesini önlemek için, bilgisayarınızda ilgili programlamayı yaparak yaralı askerin ölümüne neden olmak, sizin açınızdan ahlaki uygunluk derecesi % 75'ten fazla mıdır az mıdır?

Fazla / Az

Sizin düşüncenize göre, işkence altında düşmana gizli bilgileri vermesini önlemek için, bilgisayarınızda ilgili programlamayı yaparak yaralı askerin ölümüne neden olmanın ahlaki uygunluk derecesi % kaçtır?



### ***DÜŞMAN CASUSU:***

Savaş sırasında askeri bir birliğin komutanısınız. Askerleriniz, kısmen çöken bir binada oluşan bir çukurda aranan önemli bir düşman casusunu ağır yaralı olarak ele geçirdiler. Telsizden birliğinize, düşman askerlerinin yakındaki çok sayıdaki kasabadan birine sürpriz bir saldırı düzenleyecekleri bilgisi geldi. Eğer müdahale edemezseniz, düşman askerleri saldırdıkları kasabadaki tüm sivilleri öldürecekler. Ancak hangi kasabaya saldıracıklarını bilmiyorsunuz.

Ele geçirilen yaralı düşman casusunun hangi kasabaya saldırı planlandığını bildiğine eminsiniz. Onu sorguladınız ancak bilgi vermeyi kesinlikle ret ediyor. Casusun er ya da geç aldığı yaralar nedeni ile öleceğini biliyorsunuz.

Sorgulama sırasında casusun bulunduğu çukur, binanın temelinden yükselen su ile dolmaya başladı. Su casusun boyun hizasına kadar geliyor, kısa süre sonra boyunu aşacak ve casus boğulacak. İsteddiğiniz bilgileri vermezse onu orada bırakacağınızı söyleyerek konuşmaya zorlayabilirsiniz. Casusu bu şekilde ölüme terk ederseniz son anda istediğiniz bilgileri vereceğine eminsiniz, ancak bu aşamada onu kurtarma imkanınızın kalmayacağını da biliyorsunuz. Casus boğularak ölecek, ancak siz de bu sayede düşmanın hangi kasabaya saldıracığını öğrenebilecek ve yüzlerce masumun hayatını kurtarabileceksiniz.

Yüzlerce masum hayatı kurtarabilmek için casusu boğularak ölüme terk etmek, sizin açınızdan ahlaki uygunluk derecesi % 75'ten fazla mıdır yoksa az mıdır?

Fazla / Az

Sizin düşüncenize göre, yüzlerce masum hayatı kurtarabilmek için casusu boğularak ölüme terk etmenin ahlaki uygunluk derecesi % kaçtır?



### **İLAÇ:**

Sağlık Bakanlığında üst düzey bir yöneticisiniz. Bir şehirdeki yüzlerce insan ölümcül bir hastalığa yakalandılar. Yeni üretilen bir ilacın kullanılmaya başlamasına ilişkin karar vereceksiniz. Bu ilaç, ilgili bölgedeki ölümcül hastalığı başarı ile tedavi edebiliyor. Ancak ilacın aynı zamanda ciddi yan etkileri var. İlacın hastalara verilmesi durumunda hastaların çoğu iyileşecek, fakat küçük bir grup hasta da ilacın yan etkileri nedeni ile ölecek.

Bu ilacın ölümcül hastalığa yakalanan ilgili hastalara verilmesine karar vermek, sizin açınızdan ahlaki uygunluk derecesi %75'ten fazla mıdır yoksa az mıdır?

Fazla / Az

Sizin düşüncenize göre, bu ilacın ölümcül hastalığa yakalanan ilgili hastalara verilmesine karar vermenin ahlaki uygunluk derecesi yüzde kaçtır?



### **Manipulation Group (Low Anchor)**

#### **NOBEL ÖDÜLÜ:**

Siz ve araştırma ortağınız, güvenli, ucuz ve doğayı kirletmeyen yeni bir enerji kaynağı keşfettiniz. Bu keşif, dünyadaki çevre kirliliğini ve yoksulluğu ortadan kaldıracak boyutta bir keşif ancak, ortağınız bu keşfi satmak istiyor.

Ortağınızı iyi tanıyorsunuz ve onun bu keşfi en yüksek fiyatı veren kim olursa olsun ona satmak isteyeceğinden eminsiniz. Ortağınızın bugün bu keşfi korkunç bir silah olarak kullanmayı deneyecek birkaç potansiyel alıcı ile görüşeceğini ve bu kişilerin ortağınıza hayalinden bile geçmeyecek miktarda yüksek bir para önereceğini öğrendiniz. Bu kişiler keşfinizi ele geçirirlerse, bunu son derece tehlikeli bir silah yapımında kullanacaklar ve binlerce insanın ölümüne neden olacaklar.

Ortağınızın bu satışı yapmasını engellemek için tek yolunuz onu öldürmek. Laboratuvarında bulunan kokusuz ve renksiz yanıcı bir kimyasalı laboratuvara dökerseniz, sigara tiryakisi ortağınızın çakmağını çaktığında havaya uçacağını biliyorsunuz. Böylece herkes bunun bir laboratuvar kazası olduğunu düşünecek ve keşfiniz de bunu silah olarak kullanabilecek kişilerin eline düşmemiş olacak.

Çakmağı çaktığında ortağınızın ölümüne neden olacak olan kimyasalı laboratuvara dökerek bu yeni enerji kaynağının, onu silah olarak kullanacak kişilerin eline düşmesini ve binlerce kişinin ölümünü önlemek, sizin açınızdan ahlaki uygunluk derecesi %25'ten fazla mıdır yoksa az mıdır?

Fazla / Az

Sizin düşüncenize göre, çakmağı çaktığında ortağınızın ölümüne neden olacak olan kimyasalı laboratuvara dökerek bu yeni enerji kaynağının, onu silah olarak kullanacak kişilerin eline düşmesini ve binlerce kişinin ölümünü önlemenin ahlaki uygunluk derecesi % kaçtır?



#### **ÖTANAZİ:**

Küçük bir askeri birliği komuta ediyorsunuz. Düşman bölgesindeki görevinizi tamamlayıp dönerken, adamlarınızdan biri düşman tarafından kurulmuş kapanlardan birine basıyor ve bacağı kötü şekilde yaralanıyor. Onu kan kaybından öldürmeden bacağına kapandan kurtarmanız mümkün değil. Ancak onu ardınızda bırakırsanız da düşman birlikleri onu bulup konuşurmak için öldürene kadar işkence edecekler. Yaralı asker de en sonunda işkenceye dayanamayıp gizli bilgileri düşmana verecek. Siz bu gece farklı bir bölgeye göreve gideceğiniz için risk altında değilsiniz. Ancak yaralı askerin düşmana vereceği gizli bilgilerin onlarca askerin ölümüne neden olacağını biliyorsunuz.

Düşman birlikleri yaklaştığı için yaralı askerin yanında daha fazla kalmanız mümkün değil. Askerinizin yerini bilgisayarınızda bombalama hedefi olarak programlamanız ve bulunduğu yerin bombalanmasını sağlamanız mümkün.

İşkence altında düşmana gizli bilgileri vermesini önlemek için, bilgisayarınızda ilgili programlamayı yaparak yaralı askerin ölümüne neden olmak, sizin açınızdan ahlaki uygunluk derecesi % 25'ten fazla mıdır az mıdır?

Fazla / Az

Sizin düşüncenize göre, işkence altında düşmana gizli bilgileri vermesini önlemek için, bilgisayarınızda ilgili programlamayı yaparak yaralı askerin ölümüne neden olmanın ahlaki uygunluk derecesi % kaçtır?



### **DÜŞMAN CASUSU:**

Savaş sırasında askeri bir birliğin komutanısınız. Askerleriniz, kısmen çöken bir binada oluşan bir çukurda aranan önemli bir düşman casusunu ağır yaralı olarak ele geçirdiler. Telsizden birliğinize, düşman askerlerinin yakındaki çok sayıdaki kasabadan birine sürpriz bir saldırı düzenleyecekleri bilgisi geldi. Eğer müdahale edemezseniz, düşman askerleri saldırdıkları kasabadaki tüm sivilleri öldürecekler. Ancak hangi kasabaya saldıracıklarını bilmiyorsunuz.

Ele geçirilen yaralı düşman casusunun hangi kasabaya saldırı planlandığını bildiğine eminsiniz. Onu sorguladınız ancak bilgi vermeyi kesinlikle ret ediyor. Casusun er ya da geç aldığı yaralar nedeni ile öleceğini biliyorsunuz.

Sorgulama sırasında casusun bulunduğu çukur, binanın temelinden yükselen su ile dolmaya başladı. Su casusun boyun hizasına kadar geliyor, kısa süre sonra boyunu aşacak ve casus boğulacak. İsteddiğiniz bilgileri vermezse onu orada bırakacağınızı söyleyerek konuşmaya zorlayabilirsiniz. Casusu bu şekilde ölüme terk ederseniz son anda istediğiniz bilgileri vereceğine eminsiniz, ancak bu aşamada onu kurtarma imkanınızın kalmayacağını da biliyorsunuz. Casus boğularak ölecek, ancak siz de bu sayede düşmanın hangi kasabaya saldıracığını öğrenebilecek ve yüzlerce masumun hayatını kurtarabileceksiniz.

Yüzlerce masum hayatı kurtarabilmek için casusu boğularak ölüme terk etmek, sizin açınızdan ahlaki uygunluk derecesi % 25'ten fazla mıdır yoksa az mıdır?

Fazla / Az

Sizin düşüncenize göre, yüzlerce masum hayatı kurtarabilmek için casusu boğularak ölüme terk etmenin ahlaki uygunluk derecesi % kaçtır?



### **İLAÇ:**

Sağlık Bakanlığında üst düzey bir yöneticisiniz. Bir şehirdeki yüzlerce insan ölümcül bir hastalığa yakalandılar. Yeni üretilen bir ilacın kullanılmaya başlamasına ilişkin karar vereceksiniz. Bu ilaç, ilgili bölgedeki ölümcül hastalığı başarı ile tedavi edebiliyor. Ancak

ilacın aynı zamanda ciddi yan etkileri var. İlacın hastalara verilmesi durumunda hastaların çoğu iyileşecek, fakat küçük bir grup hasta da ilacın yan etkileri nedeni ile ölecek.

Bu ilacın ölümcül hastalığa yakalanan ilgili hastalara verilmesine karar vermek, sizin açınızdan ahlaki uygunluk derecesi %25'ten fazla mıdır yoksa az mıdır?

Fazla / Az

Sizin düşüncenize göre, bu ilacın ölümcül hastalığa yakalanan ilgili hastalara verilmesine karar vermenin ahlaki uygunluk derecesi yüzde kaçtır?



### **Manipulation Group (No Anchor)**

#### **NOBEL ÖDÜLÜ:**

Siz ve araştırma ortağınız, güvenli, ucuz ve doğayı kirletmeyen yeni bir enerji kaynağı keşfettiniz. Bu keşif, dünyadaki çevre kirliliğini ve yoksulluğu ortadan kaldıracak boyutta bir keşif ancak, ortağınız bu keşfi satmak istiyor.

Ortağınızı iyi tanıyorsunuz ve onun bu keşfi en yüksek fiyatı veren kim olursa olsun ona satmak isteyeceğinden eminsiniz. Ortağınızın bugün bu keşfi korkunç bir silah olarak kullanmayı deneyecek birkaç potansiyel alıcı ile görüşeceğini ve bu kişilerin ortağınıza hayalinden bile geçmeyecek miktarda yüksek bir para önereceğini öğrendiniz. Bu kişiler keşfinizi ele geçirirlerse, bunu son derece tehlikeli bir silah yapımında kullanacaklar ve binlerce insanın ölümüne neden olacaklar.

Ortağınızın bu satışı yapmasını engellemek için tek yolunuz onu öldürmek. Laboratuvarda bulunan kokusuz ve renksiz yanıcı bir kimyasalı laboratuvara dökerseniz, sigara tiryakisi ortağınızın çakmağını çaktığında havaya uçacağını biliyorsunuz. Böylece herkes bunun bir laboratuvar kazası olduğunu düşünecek ve keşfiniz de bunu silah olarak kullanabilecek kişilerin eline düşmemiş olacak.

Çakmağı çaktığında ortağınızın ölümüne neden olacak olan kimyasalı laboratuvara dökerek bu yeni enerji kaynağının, onu silah olarak kullanacak kişilerin eline düşmesini ve binlerce kişinin ölümünü önlemek, sizin açınızdan ahlaken uygunluk derecesi fazla mıdır yoksa az mıdır?

Fazla / Az

Sizin düşüncenize göre, çakmağı çaktığında ortağınızın ölümüne neden olacak olan kimyasalı laboratuvara dökerek bu yeni enerji kaynağının, onu silah olarak kullanacak

kişilerin eline düşmesini ve binlerce kişinin ölümünü önlemenin ahlaki uygunluk derecesi % kaçtır?



### **ÖTANAZİ:**

Küçük bir askeri birliği komuta ediyorsunuz. Düşman bölgesindeki görevinizi tamamlayıp dönerken, adamlarınızdan biri düşman tarafından kurulmuş kapanlardan birine basıyor ve bacağı kötü şekilde yaralanıyor. Onu kan kaybından öldürmeden bacağına kapandan kurtarmanız mümkün değil. Ancak onu ardınızda bırakırsanız da düşman birlikleri onu bulup konuşturmak için öldürene kadar işkence edecekler. Yaralı asker de en sonunda işkenceye dayanamayıp gizli bilgileri düşmana verecek. Siz bu gece farklı bir bölgeye göreve gideceğiniz için risk altında değilsiniz. Ancak yaralı askerin düşmana vereceği gizli bilgilerin onlarca askerin ölümüne neden olacağını biliyorsunuz.

Düşman birlikleri yaklaştığı için yaralı askerin yanında daha fazla kalmanız mümkün değil. Askerinizin yerini bilgisayarınızda bombalama hedefi olarak programlamanız ve bulunduğu yerin bombalanmasını sağlamanız mümkün.

İşkence altında düşmana gizli bilgileri vermesini önlemek için, bilgisayarınızda ilgili programlamayı yaparak yaralı askerin ölümüne neden olmak, sizin açınızdan ahlaki uygunluk derecesi fazla mıdır yoksa az mıdır?

Fazla / Az

Sizin düşüncenize göre, işkence altında düşmana gizli bilgileri vermesini önlemek için, bilgisayarınızda ilgili programlamayı yaparak yaralı askerin ölümüne neden olmanın ahlaki uygunluk derecesi % kaçtır?



### **DÜŞMAN CASUSU:**

Küçük bir askeri birliği komuta ediyorsunuz. Düşman bölgesindeki görevinizi tamamlayıp dönerken, adamlarınızdan biri düşman tarafından kurulmuş kapanlardan birine basıyor ve bacağı kötü şekilde yaralanıyor. Onu kan kaybından öldürmeden bacağına kapandan kurtarmanız mümkün değil. Ancak onu ardınızda bırakırsanız da düşman birlikleri onu bulup konuşturmak için öldürene kadar işkence edecekler. Yaralı asker de en sonunda işkenceye dayanamayıp gizli bilgileri düşmana verecek. Siz bu gece farklı bir bölgeye göreve

gideceğiniz için risk altında değilsiniz. Ancak yaralı askerin düşmana vereceği gizli bilgilerin onlarca askerin ölümüne neden olacağını biliyorsunuz.

Düşman birlikleri yaklaştığı için yaralı askerin yanında daha fazla kalmanız mümkün değil. Askerinizin yerini bilgisayarınızda bombalama hedefi olarak programlamanız ve bulunduğu yerin bombalanmasını sağlamanız mümkün.

Yüzlerce masum hayatı kurtarabilmek için casusu boğularak ölüme terk etmek, sizin açınızdan ahlaken uygunluk derecesi fazla mıdır yoksa az mıdır?

Fazla/ Az

Sizin düşüncenize göre, yüzlerce masum hayatı kurtarabilmek için casusu boğularak ölüme terk etmenin ahlaki uygunluk derecesi % kaçtır?



#### **İLAC:**

Sağlık Bakanlığında üst düzey bir yöneticisiniz. Bir şehirdeki yüzlerce insan ölümcül bir hastalığa yakalandılar. Yeni üretilen bir ilacın kullanılmaya başlamasına ilişkin karar vereceksiniz. Bu ilaç, ilgili bölgedeki ölümcül hastalığı başarı ile tedavi edebiliyor. Ancak ilacın aynı zamanda ciddi yan etkileri var. İlacın hastalara verilmesi durumunda hastaların çoğu iyileşecek, fakat küçük bir grup hasta da ilacın yan etkileri nedeni ile ölecek.

Bu ilacın ölümcül hastalığa yakalanan ilgili hastalara verilmesine karar vermek, sizin açınızdan ahlaken uygunluk derecesi fazla mıdır yoksa az mıdır?

Fazla / Az

Sizin düşüncenize göre, bu ilacın ölümcül hastalığa yakalanan ilgili hastalara verilmesine karar vermenin ahlaki uygunluk derecesi yüzde kaçtır?



## APPENDIX 5: OXFORD UTILITARIANISM SCALE

### OXFORD FAYDACILIK ÖLÇEĞİ

Aşağıdaki ifadeler sizin değişik durumlara ilişkin düşüncelerinizi araştırmaktadır. Her bir maddenin, düşüncenizi ne kadar iyi tanımladığını, ilgili maddenin hemen altında yer alan rakamlardan birini yuvarlak içine alarak belirtiniz.

Cevaplarınızı verirken aşağıdaki puanları kullanınız.

1. Kesinlikle katılmıyorum
2. Katılmıyorum
3. Biraz Katılmıyorum
4. Ne Katılıyorum Ne Katılmıyorum
5. Biraz Katılıyorum
6. Katılıyorum
7. Kesinlikle Katılıyorum

CEVAP VERMEDEN ÖNCE HER BİR MADDEYİ DİKKATLİCE OKUYUNUZ.

Lütfen dürüstçe ve içtenlikle cevap verin.

Teşekkür ederiz.

1-) Eğer, acil bir durumda başka bir kişinin hayatını kurtarmanın tek yolu kendi bacağına feda etmekse, bu durumda, bu fedakârlığı gerçekleştirmek ahlaki olarak gereklidir.

1      2      3      4      5      6      7

---

2-) Masum bir kişiye zarar vermek, eğer başka birçok masum insana yardım etmek için gerekliyse, ahlaki olarak doğrudur.

1      2      3      4      5      6      7

---

3-) Ahlaki olarak, böbrek yetmezliği olan bir kişiye böbreğimizin birini verme gereği duymamız gerekir çünkü hayatta kalmak için iki böbreğe ihtiyacımız yoktur ve sağlıklı olmak için bir tane böbrek yeterlidir.

1      2      3      4      5      6      7

---

4-) Eğer tüm insanların refahını ve mutluluğunu sağlamanın tek yolu, kısa ve sınırlı bir süre boyunca politik baskı kullanmaksa, bu durumda politik baskı kullanılmalıdır.

1      2      3      4      5      6      7

---

5-) Ahlaki açıdan, insanlar gezegen üzerindeki tüm insanların refahını eşit olarak önemsemelidir; onlara fiziksel veya duygusal olarak yakın olan kişilerin refahına özel bir önem vermemelidir.

1      2      3      4      5      6      7

---

6-) Eğer yüzlerce insanı öldürecek bir bombanın patlamasını önleyecek bir bilgiyi elde etmek için masum bir kişiye işkence etmek gerekliyse, bunu yapmak kabul edilebilir.

1      2      3      4      5      6      7

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7-) Birine yardım etmemek, ona aktif olarak zarar vermek kadar yanlıştır.

1      2      3      4      5      6      7

---

8-) Daha çok insanın kurtarılmasını sağlayacaksa, bazen yan etki olarak masum insanların ölmesi ahlaki olarak gereklidir.

1      2      3      4      5      6      7

---

9-) Eğer bağışlayarak birilerine yardım etmesi mümkünse, kişinin gerçekten ihtiyacı olmadığı parasını elinde tutması ahlaki olarak yanlıştır.

1      2      3      4      5      6      7

---

## APPENDIX 6: MORAL IDENTITY SCALE

### AHLAKİ KİMLİK ÖLÇEĞİ TÜRKÇE FORMU

Değerli Katılımcılar,

Aşağıda listelenen ifadeler bir bireyi tanımlayabilecek bazı özelliklerdir:

**Duyarlı, şefkatli, adil, arkadaş canlısı, cömert, yardımsever, çalışkan, dürüst, kibar**

Bu özelliklere sahip olan insan, siz olabilirsiniz ya da bir başkası olabilir. Bir an için, bu özelliklere sahip bir insanı zihninizde canlandırınız. Bu insanın nasıl düşüneceğini, nasıl hissedeceğini ve nasıl davranışlar sergileyeceğini hayal ediniz. Bu insanın nasıl biri olacağına ilişkin belirgin bir imge oluşturabildiyseniz, aşağıdaki soruları cevaplayınız.

Soruları cevaplarırken, ilgili maddedeki ifadeye katılım düzeyinizi 1 ile 7 arasında, “1” hiç katılmadığınızı; 7 ise tamamen katıldığınızı ifade edecek şekilde yapınız. Teşekkür ederiz.

	Hiç katılmıyorum						Tamamen katılıyorum
1. Bu özelliklere sahip bir insan olmak bana kendimi iyi hissettirirdi.	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
2. Bu özelliklere sahip biri olmak, kimliğimin önemli bir parçasıdır.	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
3. Sıklıkla, bu özelliklere sahip biri olduğumu gösteren kıyafetler giyerim.	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
4. Bu özelliklere sahip olan biri olsaydım utanç duyardım.	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
5. Boş zamanlarımda yaptığım şeyler (örn. hobiler), açık bir biçimde bu özelliklere sahip biri olduğumu gösterir.	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)

6. Okuduđum kitap ve dergi türleri, beni bu özelliklere sahip biri olarak yansıtır.	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
7. Bu özelliklere sahip biri olmak, benim için aslında önemli değildir.	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
8. Belirli kurumlardaki üyeliklerim, bu özelliklere sahip biri olduğumu diğer insanlara gösterir.	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
9. Bu özelliklere sahip biri olduğumu, diğer insanlara gösterecek etkinliklere aktif olarak katılırım.	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
10. Bu özelliklere sahip biri olmayı çok arzularım.	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)

## APPENDIX 7: MANIPULATION CHECK QUESTION

Modern karar alma teorilerinin çoğu, kararların dış dünyadaki etkilerden kopuk olmadığı gerçeğini kabul eder. Bireysel tercihler ve bilgiler, durumsal değişkenlerle birlikte karar sürecini büyük ölçüde etkileyebilir. Karar verme konusundaki araştırmamızı kolaylaştırmak için, karar alma olarak sizinle ilgili belirli faktörleri bilmek istiyoruz. Özellikle, talimatları okumaya gerçekten zaman ayırıp ayırmadığınızla ilgileniyoruz; aksi takdirde talimatları anlamanızı gerektiren bazı anketlerimiz yanlış doldurulacaktır. Bu nedenle, talimatları okuduğunuzu göstermek için lütfen aşağıdaki psikolojiniz nasıldır sorusuna "çok kötü" yanıtını verin. Çok teşekkür ederiz.

Şu andaki psikolojiniz nasıldır?

(1) çok kötü (2) kötü (3) keyifsiz (4) ne iyi ne de kötü (5) orta (6) iyi (7) çok iyi

## APPENDIX 8: DEBRIEFING FORM

Öncelikle, arařtırmaya katılım saęlayıp katkı saęladığınız için tekrar teřekkür ederim!

Bu form, arařtırmanın neden yapıldığı ve arařtırmanın kapsamıyla ilgili ayrıntıları size iletme amacıyla sunulmaktadır. Çalışmanın amacı temel olarak ahlaki konularda karar alma ve yargıya varma süreçlerini etkileyen deęişkenleri incelemektir; bu karar alma süreçleri de “ahlaki kimlik” ve literatürde “çapalama etkisi” olarak geçmekte olan deęişkenler üzerinden incelenmektedir. Bahsi geçmekte olan “çapalama etkisi” kişilerin herhangi bir karar alma anında daha önce görmüş olduęu deęerden (genellikle sayısal deęer) etkilenerek, bu deęere yakın bir ifade belirtmesi olarak ileri sürülmektedir. Ahlaki karar alma, arařtırmada yer alan senaryolara verilen cevaplar üzerinden ölçülmüştür; ayrıca deęişkenlerle ilintili olarak belirli ölçeklerin doldurulması istenmiştir. **Bu senaryolar ve ölçeklerde yer alan ifadelerin herhangi bir doęru ya da yanlış cevabı bulunmamaktır. Lütfen bu arařtırmanın içerięi, amacı ya da koşullarıyla ilgili hiçbir bilgiyi kimseyle paylaşmayın. Arařtırmaya katılanların içerik hakkına bilgi sahibi olmadan katılması gerekmektedir.**

Arařtırma hakkında daha fazla bilgi almak ve yöneltmek istediğiniz sorularınız için [b\\*\\*\\*@gmail.com](mailto:b***@gmail.com) adresinden arařtırmacıya ulaşabilirsiniz.

## APPENDIX 9: OXFORD UTILITARIANISM SCALE PERMISSION TO USE

BA

Betül Akkaya

Kime:

Bilgi:

← ↶ ↷ | ...

20.01.2024 Cmt 14:14

Sayın Dr. Filiz ve Dr. Hasan Galip Hocam,

Ben Betül Akkaya, Başkent Üniversitesi sosyal psikoloji bölümü yüksek lisans öğrencisiyim ve tez çalışmamı Elvin Doğutepe (elvind@baskent.edu.tr adresinden ulaşabileceğiniz) danışmanlığında "Ahlaki karar alma ve yargıya varma " konusu üzerinde yürütmekteyim.

Türkçeye adaptasyonunu gerçekleştirmiş olduğunuz Oxford Faydacılık Ölçeği'ni (Kumova & Bahçekapılı, 2021) ve Türk kültüründe yüksek ikilem yarattığını tespit etmiş olduğunuz dört klasik ahlaki senaryoyu (Kumova & Bahçekapılı, 2020), yürütmekte olduğum tez kapsamında kullanmak için izninizi rica ediyorum. Ölçeğinizi ve klasik ahlaki senaryoları aşağıdaki koşullar altında kullanmak istiyorum:

- Çalışmalarımızda belirttiğiniz kılavuz ilkeler kullanım aşamasında dikkate alınacaktır.
- Ölçeği sadece araştırma amacı çerçevesinde kullanacağım ve herhangi finansal amaç ile bir faaliyette bulunmayacağım.

Araştırmamda "Oxford Faydacılık Ölçeği"ni ve Türk kültüründe yüksek ikilem yarattığını tespit etmiş olduğunuz dört klasik ahlaki senaryoyu kullanmama izin vererseniz çok memnun olurum.

İlginiz için teşekkür ederim,

Saygılarımla,

FK

Filiz KUMOVA

Kime:

Bilgi:

← ↶ ↷ | ...

21.01.2024 Paz 15:32

Merhaba

Tabi ki ölçeği de senaryoları da kullanabilirsiniz. Yalnız klasik senaryoları biz makalede adı geçen iki yabancı kaynaktan uyarlamıştık. Dolayısıyla, senaryolar için bizimle birlikte ilgili yabancı kaynakları da referans göstermeniz gerekir.

Kolaylıklar diliyorum.

Filiz Kumova

## APPENDIX 10: MORAL IDENTITY SCALE PERMISSION TO USE

BA Betül Akkaya  
Kime: 22.11.2022 Sal 13:03  
Bilgi:

Sayın Dr. Ferat ve Dr. Fatih Hocam,

Ben Betül Akkaya, Başkent Üniversitesi sosyal psikoloji bölümü yüksek lisans öğrencisiyim ve tez çalışmamı Başkent Üniversite psikoloji bölümünde yer alan "Zihin ve Davranış Laboratuvarı" bünyesinde, adresinden ulaşabileceğiniz Doğan Kökdemir danışmanlığında yürütmekteyim. Ayrıca yüksek lisans sürecim içerisinde aldığım "Benliğin Psikolojisi" dersi kapsamında çalışmakta olduğum araştırma makalesini adresinden ulaşabileceğiniz Bilgesu Atılğan danışmanlığında yürütmekteyim.

Türkçeye adaptasyonunu gerçekleştirmiş olduğunuz Ahlakî Kimlik Ölçeği'ni (Yılmaz & Yılmaz,2016) , yürütmekte olduğum tez kapsamında ve ders kapsamında yazmakta olduğum araştırma makalesinde kullanmak için izninizi rica ediyorum. Ölçeğinizi aşağıdaki koşullar altında kullanmak istiyorum:

- Çalışmanızda belirttiğiniz kılavuz ilkeler ölçeği kullanım aşamasında dikkate alınacaktır.
- Ölçeği sadece araştırma amacı çerçevesinde kullanacağız ve herhangi finansal amaç ile bir faaliyette bulunmayacağız.

Araştırmalarımızda "Ahlakî Kimlik Ölçeği" kullanmamıza izin verirseniz çok memnun olurum.

İlginiz için teşekkür ederim,

Saygılarımla,

FY Ferat YILMAZ  
Kime: 22.11.2022 Sal 16:45

ahlaki KÖ (4) (1) (1).pdf  
106 KB

Betül Hocam merhabalar,  
Ahlakî Kimlik Ölçeği ektedir. Tabii ki kullanabilirsiniz.  
İyi çalışmalar

# APPENDIX 11: BASKENT UNIVERSITY INSTITUTIONAL REVIEW BOARD APPROVAL

Evrak Tarih ve Sayısı: 15.04.2024-331678



**T.C.**  
**BAŞKENT ÜNİVERSİTESİ REKTÖRLÜĞÜ**  
Akademik Değerlendirme Koordinatörlüğü



Sayı : E-62310886-605-331678  
Konu : Ayşe Betül Akkaya'nın Etik Onayı

15.04.2024

SOSYAL BİLİMLER ENSTİTÜSÜ MÜDÜRLÜĞÜNE

İlgi : 02.03.2024 tarih ve 320442 sayılı yazınız.

Enstitüsünüz Psikoloji Ana Bilim Dalı öğretim üyesi Doç. Dr. Elvin Doğutepe'nin danışmanlığında, Sosyal Psikoloji (Tezli) Yüksek Lisans programı öğrencisi, Ayşe Betül Akkaya tarafından yürütülecek olan, "Çapalama ve Ahlaki Kimliğin Ahlaki Karar Alma ve Yargıya Varma Üzerindeki Etkisi (The Effect of Anchoring and Moral Identity on Moral Judgement and Decision-Making)" adlı çalışma değerlendirilmiş ve bilgilerinize ekte sunulmuştur.

Prof. Dr. Sadegül AKBABA ALTUN  
Kurul Başkanı

Ek: Değerlendirme Formu

Bu belge, güvenli elektronik imza ile imzalanmıştır.

Belge Doğrulama Kodu :BSR5KUHRJB

Belge Doğrulama Adresi : <https://www.turkiye.gov.tr/baskent-universitesi-ebys>

Başkent Üniversitesi Bağlıca Kampüsü Fatih Sultan Mahallesi Eskişehir Yolu 18. Km

Bilgi için: Gamze SONBAY

06790 Etimesgut/ANKARA

Koordinatör

Bu belge güvenli elektronik imza ile imzalanmıştır.

İlgi: E-62310886-605-331678

Telefon No: 246 66 66 / 5138

e-Posta: adk@baskent.edu.tr İnternet Adresi: www.baskent.edu.tr  
Kep Adresi: baskentuniversitesi@hs02.kep.tr



Sayı : 17162298.600- 80  
Konu : Bilimsel Çalışma

25 Mart 2024

İlgili Makama

Üniversitemiz Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü Psikoloji Ana Bilim Dalı öğretim üyesi Doç. Dr. Elvin Doğutepe danışmanlığında, Sosyal Psikoloji (Tezli) Yüksek Lisans programı öğrencisi, Ayşe Betül Akkaya tarafından yürütülecek olan, "Çapalama ve Ahlaki Kimliğin Ahlaki Karar Alma ve Yargıya Varma Üzerindeki Etkisi (The Effect of Anchoring and Moral Identity on Moral Judgement and Decision-Making)" adlı çalışma değerlendirilmiş ve yapılmasında bir sakınca olmadığı tespit edilmiştir. Bilgilerinize saygılarımızla sunarız.

Başkent Üniversitesi Sosyal ve Beşeri Bilimler ve Sanat Alan Araştırma Kurulu

Ad, Soyad	Değerlendirme	İmza
Prof. Dr. Gözen Güner Aktaş	Olumlu/ <del>Olumsuz</del>	
Prof. Dr. Sadegül Akbaba Altun	Olumlu/ <del>Olumsuz</del>	
Prof. Dr. Fatih Çetin	Olumlu/ <del>Olumsuz</del>	
Prof. Dr. Hasan Tahsin Fendoğlu	Olumlu/ <del>Olumsuz</del>	
Prof. Dr. Filiz Kalelioğlu	Olumlu/ <del>Olumsuz</del>	
Prof. Dr. Hidayet Hale Künuçen	Olumlu/ <del>Olumsuz</del>	
Prof. Dr. Özcan Yağcı	Olumlu/ <del>Olumsuz</del>	

**Bu belge, güvenli elektronik imza ile imzalanmıştır.**